can humans BE God?
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_thaillestlunatic_
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YAM Faizal<BR><BR>I would suggest if you haven't come across Sloko Moto and Nano you should read those as well. Also, Momin Chetmani which is long but it will help you in your quest for englightenment. Check out also Budth Avataar and Bavan Bodth should help you alot. May Imam keep you prosperous and happy.
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boubou1512
- Posts: 8
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_thaillestlunatic_
- Posts: 179
- Joined: Wed Jan 21, 2004 3:06 pm
The following are some of the profound thoughts that allude to the potential of man to become God.
People say that human beings are microcosms and this outer universe a macrocosm, but for us the outer is a tiny wholeness and the inner life the vast reality. (Shams Tabriz, "Maqalat")
***
You seek knowledge from books, ridiculous!
You seek pleasure from sweets, ridiculous!
You are the sea of knowledge hidden in a dewdrop;
you are the universe hidden in a body three yards long.
-Rumi, Mathnawi [V, 3578-3579]
From "The Heart of Awareness
***
Shariputra asked: "When a follower attains the great insight of perfect wisdom, does that follower then covet and cultivate omniscience, infinite knowledge?"
The Buddha answered: "Such a follower never covets or cultivates infinite knowledge. That very attitude of not coveting and not cultivating reveals everything to him and he sees all possible structures--from objects of the senses to buddhas--to be transparent in their nature. This radiant transparency is, in fact, simply the total awakeness of a buddha. The now-awakened follower becomes, in this way, immersed in infinite wisdom and blossoms spontaneously as omniscience itself."
-Prajnaparmita
From "Buddha Speaks,"
People say that human beings are microcosms and this outer universe a macrocosm, but for us the outer is a tiny wholeness and the inner life the vast reality. (Shams Tabriz, "Maqalat")
***
You seek knowledge from books, ridiculous!
You seek pleasure from sweets, ridiculous!
You are the sea of knowledge hidden in a dewdrop;
you are the universe hidden in a body three yards long.
-Rumi, Mathnawi [V, 3578-3579]
From "The Heart of Awareness
***
Shariputra asked: "When a follower attains the great insight of perfect wisdom, does that follower then covet and cultivate omniscience, infinite knowledge?"
The Buddha answered: "Such a follower never covets or cultivates infinite knowledge. That very attitude of not coveting and not cultivating reveals everything to him and he sees all possible structures--from objects of the senses to buddhas--to be transparent in their nature. This radiant transparency is, in fact, simply the total awakeness of a buddha. The now-awakened follower becomes, in this way, immersed in infinite wisdom and blossoms spontaneously as omniscience itself."
-Prajnaparmita
From "Buddha Speaks,"
The following article explains in what manner one becomes God upon attainment of His Vision. In particular, I have highlighted the main statements in bold.
The Vision of God
by Michel Chodkiewicz
'You shall not see Me!' (lan tarânî). The divine reply to Moses' request (arinî unzur ilayka) 'Let me see, so that I can behold You', Q. 7:143), seems final. It is no less categorical in its formulation than the one that Exodus gives in a parallel account (Ex. 33:18-23):[1] 'Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live.' Another verse seems, moreover, to extend to all creatures the impossibility of seeing the Face of God, as the Prophet of the Banu Isra'il was informed: lâ tudrikuhu 'l-absâr wa huwa yudriku 'l-absâr, 'The looks do not reach Him but it is He who reaches the looks' (Q. 6:103).
Despite their evident meaning, these two verses are interpreted in many ways within the Islamic tradition and, more often than one would expect, in a way which safeguards the possibility of vision. The lan tarânî addressed to Moses, in particular, provokes numerous commentaries. The verse continues: 'But look at the mountain; if it remains firm in its place, then you shall see Me. And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, He reduced it to dust and Moses fell down, thunderstruck. When he came to himself he said, Glory be to You! I turn to You with repentance and I am the first of the believers. For Tabari, the theophany at Sinaï which reduces the mountain to dust and which even so, he says, 'had only the strength of a little finger', demonstrates the fundamental inability of creatures to bear the vision of God, and the repentance of Moses testifies that his request was presumptuous and unacceptable.[2] But another classic commentary, by Qurtubi, whilst avoiding taking sides too explicitly, favours a very different opinion. For some people, he says, lan tarânî means: 'you shall not see Me in this world'. But, he adds, according to others, whose views Qadi Iyad has recorded, 'Moses sees God and that is why he falls down in a swoon.' Similarly, commenting on the verse which states that 'the looks do not reach Him', Qurtubi, who obviously tends towards an admission of the possibility of vision, sets out the arguments of those who defend this point of view: the ordinary look cannot reach God but God creates in certain beings - and such is certainly the case of the Prophet Muhammad - a look by which He can be seen. Besides, if the impossibility were definitive, would Moses, who is an Envoy, have had the audacity to ask God for an absurd favour? Concerning Muhammad, Qurtubi relates the contradictory assertions of Aysha, on the one hand, and of Abu Hurayra and Ibn Abbas on the other, and favours the latter. The question, for him, is not to know if the Prophet saw God but to know how he saw Him: bi'l-basar? aw bi-ayni qalbihi? With his physical eyes or with the eye of the heart?[3] However, the great theologian Fakhr al-din Razi, Ibn Arabi's contemporary and correspondent, dismisses the possibility that Moses saw God, but affirms that vision is possible in principle.[4]
The position of the mutakallimûn - the theologians - on this question is generally left fairly open, at least if one discounts the case of the Mu'tazilites.[5] For the Ash'arites, it is rationally conceivable and scripturally established that 'the looks' (absâr) will see God in the future life. Does the Qur'an not assert: 'On that day, there will be radiant faces which shall see their Lord' (75:22-3)? Did the Prophet not say: 'you shall see your Lord just as you see the moon on the night of the full moon'?[6] Verse 6:103, according to which 'the looks do not reach Him', cannot justify any conclusive objection. For some theologians, it is exclusively a question of this lower world and does not apply to the heavenly status of the chosen ones. For others, it is necessary to distinguish between idrâk, 'all-embracing perception' (ihâta), effectively forever forbidden to the creatures, and ru'ya, vision itself, to which they have access but which will never exhaust the divine infinity. As for the vision of God here below, whilst it is ruled out by some, others reserve it for exceptional individuals: again, a saying of Aysha's, according to which the Prophet did not see God at the time of his mir'âj comes up in the debate and also an equally categorical assertion of Ibn Abbas's to the contrary, which relies in particular on two verses of the sûra Al-najm (Q. 53:11,13). Moreover, a du'â' is attributed to the Prophet in which he addresses God in the following terms which are very similar to those of Moses: as'aluka ladhdhat al-nazar ilâ wajhika, 'I beg of You the joy of seeing Your face'.[7]
If one now turns towards the spiritual masters who preceded Ibn 'Arabi, one finds there, too, many differences of interpretation, but this time they rely on spiritual experience rather than knowledge from books. A comparative clarification is taking place which is conveyed by the increased precision of the vocabulary. For Sahl alTustari, in the 9th century, vision stricto sensu is the privilege of the elect in the heavenly abode: kushûf al-'iyân fî-l-akhira. But the men of God benefit in advance from the kushûf al-qalb fî'l-dunyâ, from the 'lifting of the veil of the heart here below'.[8] In his Kashf al-Mahjûb, Hujwiri relies on the words of Dhu'l-Nun, Junayd and Abu Yazid al-Bistami among others, to assert that God can be contemplated in this world and that this contemplation resembles vision in the future life.[9] To the notion of 'unveiling' (root k sh f) that we have just come across, that of 'contemplation' (root sh h d) is therefore added. I shall come back, with regard to Ibn 'Arabi, to the problems posed by the vocabulary of these authors who are careful to distinguish precisely between all modes of mystical knowledge.
In his famous Risâla, Qushayri envisages three degrees in the progression towards knowledge of God: muhâdara, 'presence', mukâshafa, 'unveiling', and mushâhada, 'contemplation'.[10] These stages correspond to a standard model and, with the same or other names, one finds them almost everywhere in the literature of the tasawwuf. However, if one consults the great commentary of the Qur'an of which Qushayri is also the author, it confirms what the Risâla hinted at: that vision as such remains forbidden in this life. It is worth quoting what he writes about the incident at Sinai: 'Moses came like one of those who are consumed by desire and lost in love. Moses came without Moses. He came when nothing of Moses remained in Moses.' But, Qushayri adds, it is under the sway of this amorous drunkenness that he had the audacity to ask for vision. It was refused him but, because of this state where he no longer had control over what he was saying, he was not punished for his boldness. Muhammad himself hoped for this supreme favour, without expressing his wish, however. But he was not granted his wish either, Qushayri maintains.[11]
If we next examine the words of two other great Sufi contemporaries of the Shaykh al-Akbar, we notice that for them a direct perception of Divine Reality is definitely possible. But is it a question of anything other than what spiritual Christians called 'an advance payment of beatitude', that is, of a still confused and imperfect vision? Najm al-din Kubra describes the stages of contemplation, the last of which is the contemplation of the Unique Essence.[12] Ruzbehan Baqli, in his Tafsîr,[13] concludes from the Qur'anic text that Moses did not obtain vision. In another of his works, however, he too maintains that the viator can arrive at the point where his sirr, the secret centre of his being, 'is immersed in the ocean of the Divine Essence'.[14]
There are, therefore, considerable differences amongst the authors whom I have cited. The very meaning of the word 'vision' (ru'ya - not to be confused with ru'yâ, vision in a dream) remains, nevertheless, rather vague. Should one understand it literally as designating a perception identical to the apprehension of material objects by the organ of sight? Or is it on the contrary only necessary to retain the suggestion of an analogy, the relation between its two terms then remaining to be clarified? In the latter case, is there a radical difference in nature between 'unveiling', 'contemplation' and 'vision'? A contrario, if these terms only express differences of degree - and since the highest contemplation seems accessible to some people who are neither Envoys nor Prophets - what does the lan tarânî addressed to Moses mean? The abrupt Qur'anic phrase is variously understood but it evidently inspires a great deal of uncertainty.
The picture I have just drawn from a few examples is extremely scanty, leaving out many subtleties. I think, nevertheless, that it faithfully draws the outlines of the landscape which opens out around this Sinai where Moses, called by his Lord, is not satisfied with hearing Him and demands to see Him. Ibn 'Arabi is the heir of this long and complex tradition. He is, in particular, going to take up the rich vocabulary of spiritual phenomenology such as the men of the Way have gradually built up, without stinting nevertheless on inflecting the meaning or drawing out the significance. But above all, one is going to discover, disseminated in the immense body of his works, a teaching which, nourished by his intimate experience, illuminates the whole field of the knowledge of God, in all its forms and in all its degrees.
Before attempting to discern the essential points of his doctrine, it would be worthwhile going over the account of his own meeting with Moses, in the sixth heaven, as he relates it in Chapter 367 of the Futûhât. 'You asked to see Him', he says to Moses. 'Now, the Prophet of God has said: no-one will see God before he dies.'[15] 'That is so', replies Moses. 'When I asked to see Him, He granted my wish and I fell down thunderstruck. And it was whilst I was struck down that I saw Him.' 'Were you dead, then?' 'I was, in fact, dead.'[16] One already notices here that, for the Shaykh alAkbar, the lan tarânîis not, under certain conditions, an insurmountable obstacle.
But the issue of the vision of God and what it means for Ibn 'Arabi is not separable from an axiom which, in Akbarian doctrine, governs all methods of spiritual realisation. In accordance with the hadîth qudsî often quoted by the Shaykh al-Akbar: 'I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known...,[17] God is known because He wants to be known. He is only known because He wants to be known and He alone determines the form and the extent of this knowledge. One must never lose sight of this point if one is concerned with correctly interpreting everything that Ibn 'Arabi writes on the steps of the Way and on the charismas that correspond to them. In fact his teaching, like that of all the great masters of the Islamic tradition, presents two complementary aspects and this polarity can be a source of confusion: in so far as it is metaphysical, it explains the principles and aims; in so far as it is initiatory teaching, it explains the means and therefore takes as point of departure the awareness that the ordinary man has of himself. Now, whatever his theoretical knowledge, the disciple, when he undertakes the sulûk, does not escape from the voluntarist illusion. He considers himself to be autonomous. He is murîd - willing, desiring. He still does not know that he is murîd because he is murad - willed, desired by Him whom he claims to reach by his own powers. The initiatory teaching, therefore, in order to be realistic, displays an apparent aspect that one could call Pelagian. Read without discernment, it risks giving the impression that by putting certain precise techniques into practice - such and such a form of invocation or type of retreat (khalwa) - specific results will definitely be obtained. The literature of the turuq, in later times, unfortunately also contributes to reinforcing this impression, despite some rhetorical precautions. The Shaykh alAkbar's work, so long as one does not make selective use of it, constantly warns against this naïve and dangerous interpretation. The hadîth qudsî, the beginning of which I have already quoted, is perfectly clear about this: 'I therefore created the creatures and I made Myself known by them and it is through Me that they have known Me (fa-bî 'arafûnî).'
At the core of the vocabulary of spiritual experience, there is, therefore, in the Shaykh al-Akbar's doctrine, a term which is its key: tajallî (a word that, for the Arab Christians, designates the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor), which can be translated, according to the context, as 'epiphany' or 'theophany'. It was already used in the works of the Sufi authors whom I have mentioned but one finds it constantly in Ibn 'Arabi's writings. Moreover, it is directly linked to the verse with which this paper begins: the Divine Manifestation which reduces the mountain to dust and strikes Moses down is expressed in the Qur'an by the verb tajallâ. Tajallî is a divine act and it is by virtue of this divine act that man can attain a direct perception of God, whatever degree or form that may take.
The Akbarian doctrine of theophanies is complex.[18] I would merely like to recall here the essential features, commencing by quoting some lines which appear at the beginning of a chapter of the Futûhât which is precisely devoted to the Pole (qutb) whose 'initiatory dwelling-place' is the phrase of verse 7:143 'and when his Lord manifests on the mountain:
God - there is nothing Apparent but He in every similar and every contrary
In every kind and every species, in all union and all separation
In everything that the senses or the intellect perceive
In every body and every form.[19]
These lines express synthetically what many others explain in detail: that is, that theophanies which proceed from the divine name al-Zâhir, the Apparent[20] never cease, even if men do not know it,[21] since the universe is only the theatre where they are shown and our look, wherever it may turn, only meets with them. If this world is varied, if it is perpetually changing, it is because God does not appear twice in the same form, nor in the same form to two beings.[22]
But the perfect gnostic (al-'ârîf al-kâmil) recognises God in all these forms, unlike other men who only recognise Him when He presents Himself to them in the form of their the mental image that they make of Him.[23] This 'ârîf al-kâmil himself, however, even if he perceives the perpetual succession of theophanies, even if he distinguishes one from the other and knows why they are produced, does not know how they are produced for that is a secret which belongs only to the Essence.[24] This has already been pointed out by Henri Corbin and Toshihiko Izutsu[25] and I shall not dwell on it, my intention being limited to determining the effects of the doctrine of the tajallyât on the faculty given to man to 'grasp' God - and on this point I think it moreover necessary to correct Corbin's interpretation somewhat.
First of all, a double distinction between theophanies is essential, according to their origin on one hand and according to their form on the other. The first is standard: it is the one which establishes a hierarchy between the theophanies of the divine acts, those of the attributes and those of the Essence.[26] One already finds it in the works of authors whom I have cited, for example Najm al-din Kubra and Ruzbehan Baqli. The second, although it did not escape the masters of the past, finds its most precise and complete formulation in Ibn 'Arabi. Tajallî can appear in a sensible form or in an imaginal form. It can also be a manifestation transcending all form. When the Prophet declares, 'I have seen my Lord in the most beautiful of forms'[27] it is evidently a question of a tajallî fî 'âlam al-khayâl, in the imaginal world where 'spirits take bodies and bodies become spirits'. When Ibn 'Arabi describes his own vision of Divine Ipseity and even adds in the margin a diagram showing the figure in which the Huwiyya appeared to him,[28] there too it is a question of a theophany taking place in this intermediary world (barzakhî), which' he also calls 'Land of Truth' (ard al-haqîqa).[29]
But nothing would be more contrary to the Shaykh al-Akbar's thought than to believe that this imaginal world constitutes the nec plus ultra. By insisting on the importance for Ibn 'Arabi of the notion of the 'âlam al-khayâl, Corbin filled a serious gap in previous studies. By paying too much attention to this discovery, he was led to overestimate its importance and reduced the field of perceptions of the divine to the domain of formal theophanies. Many of Ibn 'Arabi's works overrule this limitation which would prohibit all access to the absolute nakedness of the Divine Essence: forms, be they tangible or imaginal, are created and cannot confine the uncreated. The highest knowledge is beyond every image; it requires what Meister Eckhart calls entbildung. If the perception of the tajallî suwwarî or barzakhî represents, relative to the blindness of the majority of human beings in their earthly condition, a considerable privilege, it remains very imperfect. If, under different names - most often mushâhada - it occupies an important place in the account of the spiritual experience of Ibn 'Arabi himself or other awliyâ', it is because theophany, when it is formal, can, up to a point, be described. Speaking of a famous contemporary Sufi, 'Umar Suhrawardi, Ibn 'Arabi emphasises several times that his tajallî was only barzakhî for otherwise he would not have maintained that it was possible to look at God and hear Him at the same time.[30] 'When He (God) allows Himself to be gazed upon, He does not speak to you', he wrote in another passage, 'and when He speaks to you, He does not allow Himself to be seen unless it is a question of a theophany in a form':[31] this wording obviously implies the possibility of a supraformal theophany.
Some important information about this can be found in the 'Book of Theophanies', of which Osman Yahya has compiled an excellent critical edition accompanied by a commentary by Ibn Sawdakin, which transcribes the explanations which he received from Ibn 'Arabi's own mouth, and by an anonymous commentary, the Kashf al-Ghayât, sometimes attributed to 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili but which is probably not his work.[32] Chapters LXX, LXXI and LXXII describe successively the theophanies of 'red light', 'white light' and 'green light' and the meetings that the Shaykh al-Akbar had at each of these stages: with 'Ali b. Abi Talib in the first, then with Abu Bakr and finally with 'Umar. Here we are at the closest to the mystery of the Essence which is symbolised by the 'radiant light (al-nûr al-sha'sha'ânî) by which one apprehends but which cannot itself be apprehended' because of its blinding brilliance.[33] The red light, the Kashf al-Ghayât tells us, is only a reflection of this light of the Essence in the immensity of the khayâl mutlaq, and it is still only a question here of a ru'ya mithâliyya, of a vision in imaginal form. The white light represents a more elevated degree than the red and green for, Ibn 'Arabi tells Ibn Sawdakin, 'the colour white is the only one which includes all the others.. Its rank is that of the Name of Majesty [Allâh] amongst the other Names and that of the Essence amongst the attributes.'[34] But Abu Bakr, however, who is standing in this white light, has his face turned towards the west - the place of occultation of light for the west is 'the mine of secrets': thus it is clearly pointed out to us that it is beyond the highest formal theophanies, beyond created lights, that the uncreated light of the Divine Essence is revealed to him who turns towards the 'occidental' darkness.[35]
All vision assumes a commensurateness (munâsaba) between that which sees and that which is seen. Between the divine infinity and the limitedness of the creature, this munâsaba is evidently lacking and all possibility of 'seeing God' other than in an indirect way, in the forms in which He manifests His names, seems then to be excluded.[36] If mushâhada is like that, the contemplation accessible to mortals is not even an 'advance payment' of the beatific vision promised to the elect who will see God 'like the moon on the night of the full moon': it is only a very imperfect prefiguration of it. That is what the definition that Ibn 'Arabi gives of it seems to confirm: contemplation, he says, is indeed vision (ru'ya), but a vision which is preceded, on the part of he who sees, by a knowledge of what he is going to see. It is then strictly limited since the contemplator refuses to recognise the theophany as such if it presents itself other than in conformity to his previous conception, with his î'tiqâd. Vision stricto sensu, on the contrary, presupposes the absence of this preliminary conditioning of which the contemplator is the prisoner. It receives all theophanies without subjecting them to the test of recognition, without referring them to a previous model.[37] One may note, however, that Ibn 'Arabi, despite these very rigorous technical definitions, does not feel obliged to respect the distinction thus established between mushâhada and ru'ya and, on many occasions, employs one or the other word indifferently. Nevertheless, the context allows one, as we shall see, to clear away the apparent ambiguities and contradictions.
When Ibn 'Arabi writes that 'theophany only occurs in the forms of beliefs (i'tiqâdât) or needs (hâjât)',38 or again that 'the Theophany of the Essence can only take place in the form of mental images and conceptual categories (ma'qûlât),[39] these remarks only apply to contemplation taken in its limited sense. But he also says, 'God has servants whom he has allowed to see Him in this life without waiting for the future life';[40] now, to describe what, this time, is indeed vision, he often uses the terms shuhûd and mushâhada. This is the case in a passage of the Futûhât where, speaking of the muqarrabûn (those who are brought close), a term which for him designates the highest degree of sainthood, he states that they are in perpetual contemplation and never come out of it although 'the tastes of it are varied'.[41]
How can such people overcome the obstacle which the total absence of proportion between God and man presents? 'The looks do not reach Him' states the Qur'an. Although he often has recourse to the traditional distinction between 'interior sight' (basîra) and 'exterior sight' (basar), Ibn 'Arabi overlooks it here; what he retains is the fact that the Qur'an uses the plural absâr and not the singular basar.[42] The multiplicity inherent to the creature cannot in fact grasp the One. It follows that 'it is God's look which reaches God and sees Him and not yours'.[43] 'He is the One who sees, He who is seen and that by which He is seen.'[44]
Therein resides the paradox of vision. Only he who has lost everything, he whose contemplation is free from all form, attains to the Being in His absoluteness. Nothing remains of 'he who has lost everything' (al-muflis): in contradistinction to formal theophanies, which are compatible with the subsistence (baqâ') of the creature, this tajallî which is beyond forms implies the annihilation (fanâ') of the one to whom it is granted.[45] It prevents by that very fact all appropriation of vision - and that is the true sense of the lan tarânî the grammatical 'second person' has no place besides the divine 'I'. 'The Essential Divine Reality is too elevated to be contemplated... whilst there remains a trace of the creaturial condition in the eye of the contemplator.'[46] This extinction of the contemplator in the most perfect contemplation has a logical consequence which may, however, seem strange: in this mushâhada - or to give it its real name, this ru'ya - there is neither joy, nor knowledge.[47] A logical consequence in fact since 'joy' and 'knowledge' would imply a reflexive action, a turning back on oneself which is incompatible with the sine qua non of vision of God. But would it not then be a question of a sort of coma of which one would ill understand that it constituted a privilege?
Ibn 'Arabi gives a reply to this in several of his works:[48] joy and knowledge are the fruits of mushâhada but these fruits cannot be garnered except on coming out of the contemplative state. For, corresponding to every true mushâhada (otherwise it would only be 'a drowsiness of the heart', nawmat al-qalb) there is necessarily a 'witness' (shâhid). This witness, who takes over the evidence of the vision and authenticates it (allusion to Q. 11:17, wa yatlûhu shâhidun minhu), is 'the trace left in the heart of the contemplator by the contemplation'.[49] Having regained consciousness, like Moses after the tajallî which struck him down, the individual then delights in this supreme knowledge whose price is precisely the unconditional submission to the mortal splendour of theophany. 'No one will see his Lord before he dies', the Prophet said.[50] But he also said: 'Die before you die.'[51] And that is why Ibn 'Arabi, echoing this hadîth, unhesitatingly wrote in the Kitâb al-Tajalliyât [52]: 'Demand vision and do not be afraid of being struck down!'
Are there any favoured places or times for this vision? God is free to manifest Himself when He wishes, to whom He wishes, how He wishes. But He has let His servants know the Surest of ways that lead to Him. It is only given to the creature to see God through God's eye. Now a well-known hadîth qudsi teaches us, with reference to the servant whom God loves: 'When I love him, I am his hearing by which he hears, his look by which he sees...
We are told that this servant approaches God by supererogatory acts. But, the hadîth specifies: 'He does not approach Me through something which I love more than with the acts that I have prescribed for him.' These prescribed acts, the farâ'id, are therefore above all those which may lead to vision, and the reason for this is that they already represent a form of death since the will of the servant plays no part in them: it is God alone who determines their moments and their forms.[54] But, among these obligatory acts, there is one which holds a particular importance: the ritual prayer (al-salât) which is, as the Prophet said, mi'râj al-mu'min, the 'spiritual ascension of the believer'. For Ibn 'Arabi, this ritual prayer is the favoured place for the highest theophanies. These theophanies, always new, appear hierarchically in a harmonic relation to the different positions prescribed for the believer. I have shown elsewhere[55] that some replies formulated in enigmatic terms to Tirmidhi's well-known questionnaire would be elucidated once one understood that they refer to the salât. The mysterious sessions (majâlis) during which God speaks correspond to the julûs, the sitting position, which symbolises stability, vigilance and permanence (baqâ'): conditions which are all necessary to hear the divine discourse but which exclude vision. But those to whom God thus speaks (the muhaddathûn) and who, in this respect, are 'behind a veil' are also in another respect ahl al-shuhûd, people of contemplation.
They are so when the conditions required to hear God disappear and are replaced by their opposite: annihilation, which tears the veil and of which the symbol is sujûd, prostration. Do not let the word 'symbol' mislead us. For most people prostration is most certainly nothing more than a gestural representation of this annihilation which must leave all the space to the One without second. For some, this symbol is operative and for them what Ibn 'Arabi writes in the Tanazzulât Mawsiliyya [56] is verified: 'your rising up is in your abasement'. When their body crashes against the earth, they arrive at the summit of the 'Sinaï of their being'. And, there, the lan tarânî resounds in the void; there is no longer anyone to hear it.
NOTES
1. For the biblical facts relating to the vision of God, see also Judges: 6, 22-3 and 13, 22. Cf. also the article by Colette Sirat, 'Un midrasch juif en habit musulman: la vision de Moïse sur le Mont Sinai', Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, Vol. CLXVIII, no.1, 1965, pp. 15ff.
2. Tabari, Jâmi al-Bayân, ed. Shakir, XIII, pp. 90-l05.
3. Qurtubi, Al-Jami li-Ahkâm al-Qur'ân, Cairo, 1938, VII, pp. 278-80 (on 7:143) and VII, p.54 (on 6:103).
4. Fakhr al-din Razi, Tafsîr Teheran, undated, XIV, pp. 227-34.
5. We are summing up very briefly here a set of attitudes that, of course, present divergencies which it is not appropriate to list here. On the doctrine of the Ash'arite kalâm concerning this subject see Daniel Gimaret, La Doctrine d'Al-Ash'arî, Paris, 1990, second part, Ch. X, p.329-45.
6. Bukhari, tawhîd, 24, pp.1-S.
7. Darimi, 'aqâ'id, 303, pp.11-12.
8. On Tustari, refer to the work by Gerhard Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam, Berlin-New York, 1980, pp. 165-75. Niffari's position regarding the possibility of vision here below seems to be more positive. See his Mawâqif, ed. A.J. Arberry, London, 1935 (see index for ru'yat Allâh).
9. Hujwiri, Kashf al-Mahjûb, trans. R.A. Nicholson, 6th edn, London, 1976, pp. 329-33.
10. Qushayri, Risâla, Cairo, 1957, p.40.
11. Qushayri, Lata'îf al-Isharât, ed. Ibrahim al-Basyuni, Cairo, undated, II, pp. 259-62.
12. Najm al-din Kubra, Fawâ'ih al-Jamâl, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden, 1957, paras. 42, 95, 97.
13. Ruzbehan Baqli, Arâ'is al-Bayân, Indian lithographed edn, 1315 H., I, pp. 271-7.
14. Ruzbehan Baqli, Mashrab al-Arwah, Istanbul, 1973, p.215.
15. Ibn Maja, fitan, p.33.
16. Al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya, Bulaq, 1329 H., III, p.349.
17. This hadîth does not appear in the canonic collections. For its use by Ibn 'Arabi, see for example, Futûhât, II, pp. 232, 327, 399; III, p.267.
18. There are many references to texts of Ibn 'Arabi's relating to the idea of tajallî in the work of Souad Hakim, Al-Mu'jam al-Sûfî, Beirut, 1981, pp. 257-67.
19. Futûhât, IV, p.591.
20. Ibid., I. p.166.
21. Ibid., I. p.498.
22. An oft-repeated statement. See, for example, Ibid., IV, p.19.
23. Ibid., III, pp.132-3.
24. Ibid., II. p.597. Ibn 'Arabi points out that the secret of kayfiyya is unknown even to the prophets and the angels.
25. Cf. Henry Corbin, L'imagination Créatrice dans le Soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, Paris, 1958, Part Two; Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, Tokyo, 1983, Ch. 11.
26. Futûhât, I, p.91.
27. On this hadîth of disputed authenticity, cf. H. Ritter, Das Meer der Seele, Leiden, 1956, pp. 445 ff. Cf. also Jili, Insân Kâmil, Cairo, 1963, Ch. 42.
28. This vision, which occurred on the night of Wednesday 4th of the month of rabî al-thânî in the year 627, is described in Futûhât, II, p. 449 (27th fasl of Ch. 198) but the diagram which accompanies the account has not been reproduced by the editor. It appears in the 1293 H edition, II, p.591, and is reproduced by Asin Palacios, El Islam Cristianizado, Madrid, 1931, p.105, by Corbin, L'imagination, p.175, and by A.A. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Ibnu'l-'Arabî, Cambridge, 1939, p.114.
29. This is specifically the title of Chapter 8 of the Futûhât which is a description of this 'imaginal world'.
30. Ibid., I, p.609; III. p.213.
31. Ibid., I, p. 397. Corbin's position, which excludes all informal contemplation, is defined in particular, in L'imagination, Part Two, Ch. 4 ('La Forme de Dieu'). It is based on a very selective reading of Ibn 'Arabi and of Jili (see, on the latter, Ch. 41 and Ch. 62 of Insân Kâmil where he refers to verse 7:143).
32. Kitâb al-Tajalliyât, Teheran, 1988. The vocabulary of the Kashf al-Ghayât presents significant differences from that of Jili. The text makes no reference, besides, to other works by Jili, contrary to the latter's custom.
33. Ibid., pp.420-i. The Prophet said of this light: Nûrun annâ arâhu, 'It is a light, how should I see it?' (Muslim, îmân, p.291; Tirmidhi, tafsîr S. 53:7). On this hadîth see Futûhât, IV, pp. 38-9.
34. Ibid., p.425. Cf. also the Kashf al-Ghayât, p.429. Note that, in the vision mentioned in Note 28, the Divine Ipseity appears to Ibn 'Arabi as a figure of white light on a background of red light.
35. On the symbolism of the west in Ibn 'Arabi, see Futûhât, I, pp. 67, 68,71; II, p.121; III, p.287; Kitâb al-Intisâr, printed in Rasâ'il Ibn al-'Arabi, Hyderabad, India, 1948, 2 vols, p.4.
36. Futûhât, IV, p.38.
37 Ibid., II, p.567.
38. Ibid., II, pp.277-8 and III, p.119. The episode of the Burning Bush illustrates, for Ibn 'Arabi, the theophany 'in the form of one's needs': because Moses is seeking fire, it is in the form of fire that God manifests Himself to him (cf. Fusûs al-Hikam, ed. A.A. Affifi, Beirut, 1946, pp. 212-13).
39. Futûhât, II, p.606.
40. Ibid., IV, p.38.
41. Ibid., III, p. 104. This Chapter 328 forms part of the series of 114 manâzil ('spiritual abodes') which, as I have shown in a recent book (Un Océan sans Rivage, Paris, 1992, Ch. III; an English translation of this work has been published by SUNY Press in 1993), correspond to the sûras of the Qur'an in reverse order. Chapter 328 corresponds to sum 56 and the terms which are used there (sâbiqûn, muqarrabûn, etc.) are taken from this sûra.
42. Futûhât, IV, pp.37-8.
43. Ibid., IV, p.2.
44. Ibid., IV, p.38.
45. Ibid., III, p.105 and JV, p.191. Such is also the position of Qashani in a short unedited letter (Risâla ft Qawlihi ta'âlâ: Arinî Unzur Ilayka) MS Yahya Ef. 2415, folios 14-15.
46. Kitâb al-Fanâ' fî'l-Mushâhada (Rasâ'il), p.2. Note that this treatise is a complement to Chapter 286 of the Futûhât which corresponds, in the order of the manâzil, to sum 98 and whose theme is taken from the first two words (lan yakun) of this sum (Un Océan sans Rivage, Ch. V).
47. Kitâb al-Tarâjim (Rasâ'il), p.42. See also Futûhât, IV, p.55.
48. See Futûhât, Ch. 266; Kitâb al-Tarâjim, p.16; Kitâb Wasâ'il al-Sâ'îl, ed. M. Profitlich, Fribourg, 1973, pp. 43-S; see also Badr al-Habashi's Kitâb al-Inbâh, ed. Denis Gril, in Annales Islamologiques, XV, 1979, p.106, para. 8.
49. Istilâhât al-Sûfiyya (Rasâ'il), no.60. This definition is taken up by Qashani, amongst others, in a work of the same title (Cairo, 1981, pp.153-4) and by Jurjani in his Ta'rifât, Cairo, 1357 H, p.114.
50. Cf. note 15.
51. Tirmidhi, qiyâma, 25. On this theme of 'initiatory death', see Futûhât, II, p.187; III, pp. 223, 288.
52. Chapter 100, p.517.
53. Bukhari, tawâdu. Ibn 'Arabi has included this hadîth in his Mishkât al-Anwâr and quotes it and comments on it many times. (Futûhât, I, p.406; III, p. 68; IV, pp. 20, 24,30, 65, 312, 321, etc.)
54. That is why, for Ibn 'Arabi (cf. in particular Futûhât, IV, pp. 24. 449), the closeness acquired by the accomplishment of obligator) acts (qurb al-farâ'id) is more perfect than that obtained by the accomplishment of supererogatory acts (qurb al-nawâfil). It is to the former that the case of the muqarrabûn corresponds (ibid., II, p.104) for whom 'contemplation is perpetual' and who see 'the multiplicity in the One and separation in union'. On this subject, see Un Océan sans Rivage, pp. 144ff. and my translation of the Ecrits Spirituels by Emir 'Abd al-Kader, Paris, 1982, note 84, pp. 202-4.
55. Un Océan sans Rivage, pp. 136ff.
56. Tanazzulât Mawsiliyya, Cairo, 1961 (under the title Latâ'if al-Asrâr), p.103.
Translated from French by Cecilia Twinch
This article appeared first in volume XIV of the Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society (1993), published as a special issue under the title "Prayer and Contemplation".
The Vision of God
by Michel Chodkiewicz
'You shall not see Me!' (lan tarânî). The divine reply to Moses' request (arinî unzur ilayka) 'Let me see, so that I can behold You', Q. 7:143), seems final. It is no less categorical in its formulation than the one that Exodus gives in a parallel account (Ex. 33:18-23):[1] 'Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live.' Another verse seems, moreover, to extend to all creatures the impossibility of seeing the Face of God, as the Prophet of the Banu Isra'il was informed: lâ tudrikuhu 'l-absâr wa huwa yudriku 'l-absâr, 'The looks do not reach Him but it is He who reaches the looks' (Q. 6:103).
Despite their evident meaning, these two verses are interpreted in many ways within the Islamic tradition and, more often than one would expect, in a way which safeguards the possibility of vision. The lan tarânî addressed to Moses, in particular, provokes numerous commentaries. The verse continues: 'But look at the mountain; if it remains firm in its place, then you shall see Me. And when his Lord manifested Himself to the mountain, He reduced it to dust and Moses fell down, thunderstruck. When he came to himself he said, Glory be to You! I turn to You with repentance and I am the first of the believers. For Tabari, the theophany at Sinaï which reduces the mountain to dust and which even so, he says, 'had only the strength of a little finger', demonstrates the fundamental inability of creatures to bear the vision of God, and the repentance of Moses testifies that his request was presumptuous and unacceptable.[2] But another classic commentary, by Qurtubi, whilst avoiding taking sides too explicitly, favours a very different opinion. For some people, he says, lan tarânî means: 'you shall not see Me in this world'. But, he adds, according to others, whose views Qadi Iyad has recorded, 'Moses sees God and that is why he falls down in a swoon.' Similarly, commenting on the verse which states that 'the looks do not reach Him', Qurtubi, who obviously tends towards an admission of the possibility of vision, sets out the arguments of those who defend this point of view: the ordinary look cannot reach God but God creates in certain beings - and such is certainly the case of the Prophet Muhammad - a look by which He can be seen. Besides, if the impossibility were definitive, would Moses, who is an Envoy, have had the audacity to ask God for an absurd favour? Concerning Muhammad, Qurtubi relates the contradictory assertions of Aysha, on the one hand, and of Abu Hurayra and Ibn Abbas on the other, and favours the latter. The question, for him, is not to know if the Prophet saw God but to know how he saw Him: bi'l-basar? aw bi-ayni qalbihi? With his physical eyes or with the eye of the heart?[3] However, the great theologian Fakhr al-din Razi, Ibn Arabi's contemporary and correspondent, dismisses the possibility that Moses saw God, but affirms that vision is possible in principle.[4]
The position of the mutakallimûn - the theologians - on this question is generally left fairly open, at least if one discounts the case of the Mu'tazilites.[5] For the Ash'arites, it is rationally conceivable and scripturally established that 'the looks' (absâr) will see God in the future life. Does the Qur'an not assert: 'On that day, there will be radiant faces which shall see their Lord' (75:22-3)? Did the Prophet not say: 'you shall see your Lord just as you see the moon on the night of the full moon'?[6] Verse 6:103, according to which 'the looks do not reach Him', cannot justify any conclusive objection. For some theologians, it is exclusively a question of this lower world and does not apply to the heavenly status of the chosen ones. For others, it is necessary to distinguish between idrâk, 'all-embracing perception' (ihâta), effectively forever forbidden to the creatures, and ru'ya, vision itself, to which they have access but which will never exhaust the divine infinity. As for the vision of God here below, whilst it is ruled out by some, others reserve it for exceptional individuals: again, a saying of Aysha's, according to which the Prophet did not see God at the time of his mir'âj comes up in the debate and also an equally categorical assertion of Ibn Abbas's to the contrary, which relies in particular on two verses of the sûra Al-najm (Q. 53:11,13). Moreover, a du'â' is attributed to the Prophet in which he addresses God in the following terms which are very similar to those of Moses: as'aluka ladhdhat al-nazar ilâ wajhika, 'I beg of You the joy of seeing Your face'.[7]
If one now turns towards the spiritual masters who preceded Ibn 'Arabi, one finds there, too, many differences of interpretation, but this time they rely on spiritual experience rather than knowledge from books. A comparative clarification is taking place which is conveyed by the increased precision of the vocabulary. For Sahl alTustari, in the 9th century, vision stricto sensu is the privilege of the elect in the heavenly abode: kushûf al-'iyân fî-l-akhira. But the men of God benefit in advance from the kushûf al-qalb fî'l-dunyâ, from the 'lifting of the veil of the heart here below'.[8] In his Kashf al-Mahjûb, Hujwiri relies on the words of Dhu'l-Nun, Junayd and Abu Yazid al-Bistami among others, to assert that God can be contemplated in this world and that this contemplation resembles vision in the future life.[9] To the notion of 'unveiling' (root k sh f) that we have just come across, that of 'contemplation' (root sh h d) is therefore added. I shall come back, with regard to Ibn 'Arabi, to the problems posed by the vocabulary of these authors who are careful to distinguish precisely between all modes of mystical knowledge.
In his famous Risâla, Qushayri envisages three degrees in the progression towards knowledge of God: muhâdara, 'presence', mukâshafa, 'unveiling', and mushâhada, 'contemplation'.[10] These stages correspond to a standard model and, with the same or other names, one finds them almost everywhere in the literature of the tasawwuf. However, if one consults the great commentary of the Qur'an of which Qushayri is also the author, it confirms what the Risâla hinted at: that vision as such remains forbidden in this life. It is worth quoting what he writes about the incident at Sinai: 'Moses came like one of those who are consumed by desire and lost in love. Moses came without Moses. He came when nothing of Moses remained in Moses.' But, Qushayri adds, it is under the sway of this amorous drunkenness that he had the audacity to ask for vision. It was refused him but, because of this state where he no longer had control over what he was saying, he was not punished for his boldness. Muhammad himself hoped for this supreme favour, without expressing his wish, however. But he was not granted his wish either, Qushayri maintains.[11]
If we next examine the words of two other great Sufi contemporaries of the Shaykh al-Akbar, we notice that for them a direct perception of Divine Reality is definitely possible. But is it a question of anything other than what spiritual Christians called 'an advance payment of beatitude', that is, of a still confused and imperfect vision? Najm al-din Kubra describes the stages of contemplation, the last of which is the contemplation of the Unique Essence.[12] Ruzbehan Baqli, in his Tafsîr,[13] concludes from the Qur'anic text that Moses did not obtain vision. In another of his works, however, he too maintains that the viator can arrive at the point where his sirr, the secret centre of his being, 'is immersed in the ocean of the Divine Essence'.[14]
There are, therefore, considerable differences amongst the authors whom I have cited. The very meaning of the word 'vision' (ru'ya - not to be confused with ru'yâ, vision in a dream) remains, nevertheless, rather vague. Should one understand it literally as designating a perception identical to the apprehension of material objects by the organ of sight? Or is it on the contrary only necessary to retain the suggestion of an analogy, the relation between its two terms then remaining to be clarified? In the latter case, is there a radical difference in nature between 'unveiling', 'contemplation' and 'vision'? A contrario, if these terms only express differences of degree - and since the highest contemplation seems accessible to some people who are neither Envoys nor Prophets - what does the lan tarânî addressed to Moses mean? The abrupt Qur'anic phrase is variously understood but it evidently inspires a great deal of uncertainty.
The picture I have just drawn from a few examples is extremely scanty, leaving out many subtleties. I think, nevertheless, that it faithfully draws the outlines of the landscape which opens out around this Sinai where Moses, called by his Lord, is not satisfied with hearing Him and demands to see Him. Ibn 'Arabi is the heir of this long and complex tradition. He is, in particular, going to take up the rich vocabulary of spiritual phenomenology such as the men of the Way have gradually built up, without stinting nevertheless on inflecting the meaning or drawing out the significance. But above all, one is going to discover, disseminated in the immense body of his works, a teaching which, nourished by his intimate experience, illuminates the whole field of the knowledge of God, in all its forms and in all its degrees.
Before attempting to discern the essential points of his doctrine, it would be worthwhile going over the account of his own meeting with Moses, in the sixth heaven, as he relates it in Chapter 367 of the Futûhât. 'You asked to see Him', he says to Moses. 'Now, the Prophet of God has said: no-one will see God before he dies.'[15] 'That is so', replies Moses. 'When I asked to see Him, He granted my wish and I fell down thunderstruck. And it was whilst I was struck down that I saw Him.' 'Were you dead, then?' 'I was, in fact, dead.'[16] One already notices here that, for the Shaykh alAkbar, the lan tarânîis not, under certain conditions, an insurmountable obstacle.
But the issue of the vision of God and what it means for Ibn 'Arabi is not separable from an axiom which, in Akbarian doctrine, governs all methods of spiritual realisation. In accordance with the hadîth qudsî often quoted by the Shaykh al-Akbar: 'I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known...,[17] God is known because He wants to be known. He is only known because He wants to be known and He alone determines the form and the extent of this knowledge. One must never lose sight of this point if one is concerned with correctly interpreting everything that Ibn 'Arabi writes on the steps of the Way and on the charismas that correspond to them. In fact his teaching, like that of all the great masters of the Islamic tradition, presents two complementary aspects and this polarity can be a source of confusion: in so far as it is metaphysical, it explains the principles and aims; in so far as it is initiatory teaching, it explains the means and therefore takes as point of departure the awareness that the ordinary man has of himself. Now, whatever his theoretical knowledge, the disciple, when he undertakes the sulûk, does not escape from the voluntarist illusion. He considers himself to be autonomous. He is murîd - willing, desiring. He still does not know that he is murîd because he is murad - willed, desired by Him whom he claims to reach by his own powers. The initiatory teaching, therefore, in order to be realistic, displays an apparent aspect that one could call Pelagian. Read without discernment, it risks giving the impression that by putting certain precise techniques into practice - such and such a form of invocation or type of retreat (khalwa) - specific results will definitely be obtained. The literature of the turuq, in later times, unfortunately also contributes to reinforcing this impression, despite some rhetorical precautions. The Shaykh alAkbar's work, so long as one does not make selective use of it, constantly warns against this naïve and dangerous interpretation. The hadîth qudsî, the beginning of which I have already quoted, is perfectly clear about this: 'I therefore created the creatures and I made Myself known by them and it is through Me that they have known Me (fa-bî 'arafûnî).'
At the core of the vocabulary of spiritual experience, there is, therefore, in the Shaykh al-Akbar's doctrine, a term which is its key: tajallî (a word that, for the Arab Christians, designates the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor), which can be translated, according to the context, as 'epiphany' or 'theophany'. It was already used in the works of the Sufi authors whom I have mentioned but one finds it constantly in Ibn 'Arabi's writings. Moreover, it is directly linked to the verse with which this paper begins: the Divine Manifestation which reduces the mountain to dust and strikes Moses down is expressed in the Qur'an by the verb tajallâ. Tajallî is a divine act and it is by virtue of this divine act that man can attain a direct perception of God, whatever degree or form that may take.
The Akbarian doctrine of theophanies is complex.[18] I would merely like to recall here the essential features, commencing by quoting some lines which appear at the beginning of a chapter of the Futûhât which is precisely devoted to the Pole (qutb) whose 'initiatory dwelling-place' is the phrase of verse 7:143 'and when his Lord manifests on the mountain:
God - there is nothing Apparent but He in every similar and every contrary
In every kind and every species, in all union and all separation
In everything that the senses or the intellect perceive
In every body and every form.[19]
These lines express synthetically what many others explain in detail: that is, that theophanies which proceed from the divine name al-Zâhir, the Apparent[20] never cease, even if men do not know it,[21] since the universe is only the theatre where they are shown and our look, wherever it may turn, only meets with them. If this world is varied, if it is perpetually changing, it is because God does not appear twice in the same form, nor in the same form to two beings.[22]
But the perfect gnostic (al-'ârîf al-kâmil) recognises God in all these forms, unlike other men who only recognise Him when He presents Himself to them in the form of their the mental image that they make of Him.[23] This 'ârîf al-kâmil himself, however, even if he perceives the perpetual succession of theophanies, even if he distinguishes one from the other and knows why they are produced, does not know how they are produced for that is a secret which belongs only to the Essence.[24] This has already been pointed out by Henri Corbin and Toshihiko Izutsu[25] and I shall not dwell on it, my intention being limited to determining the effects of the doctrine of the tajallyât on the faculty given to man to 'grasp' God - and on this point I think it moreover necessary to correct Corbin's interpretation somewhat.
First of all, a double distinction between theophanies is essential, according to their origin on one hand and according to their form on the other. The first is standard: it is the one which establishes a hierarchy between the theophanies of the divine acts, those of the attributes and those of the Essence.[26] One already finds it in the works of authors whom I have cited, for example Najm al-din Kubra and Ruzbehan Baqli. The second, although it did not escape the masters of the past, finds its most precise and complete formulation in Ibn 'Arabi. Tajallî can appear in a sensible form or in an imaginal form. It can also be a manifestation transcending all form. When the Prophet declares, 'I have seen my Lord in the most beautiful of forms'[27] it is evidently a question of a tajallî fî 'âlam al-khayâl, in the imaginal world where 'spirits take bodies and bodies become spirits'. When Ibn 'Arabi describes his own vision of Divine Ipseity and even adds in the margin a diagram showing the figure in which the Huwiyya appeared to him,[28] there too it is a question of a theophany taking place in this intermediary world (barzakhî), which' he also calls 'Land of Truth' (ard al-haqîqa).[29]
But nothing would be more contrary to the Shaykh al-Akbar's thought than to believe that this imaginal world constitutes the nec plus ultra. By insisting on the importance for Ibn 'Arabi of the notion of the 'âlam al-khayâl, Corbin filled a serious gap in previous studies. By paying too much attention to this discovery, he was led to overestimate its importance and reduced the field of perceptions of the divine to the domain of formal theophanies. Many of Ibn 'Arabi's works overrule this limitation which would prohibit all access to the absolute nakedness of the Divine Essence: forms, be they tangible or imaginal, are created and cannot confine the uncreated. The highest knowledge is beyond every image; it requires what Meister Eckhart calls entbildung. If the perception of the tajallî suwwarî or barzakhî represents, relative to the blindness of the majority of human beings in their earthly condition, a considerable privilege, it remains very imperfect. If, under different names - most often mushâhada - it occupies an important place in the account of the spiritual experience of Ibn 'Arabi himself or other awliyâ', it is because theophany, when it is formal, can, up to a point, be described. Speaking of a famous contemporary Sufi, 'Umar Suhrawardi, Ibn 'Arabi emphasises several times that his tajallî was only barzakhî for otherwise he would not have maintained that it was possible to look at God and hear Him at the same time.[30] 'When He (God) allows Himself to be gazed upon, He does not speak to you', he wrote in another passage, 'and when He speaks to you, He does not allow Himself to be seen unless it is a question of a theophany in a form':[31] this wording obviously implies the possibility of a supraformal theophany.
Some important information about this can be found in the 'Book of Theophanies', of which Osman Yahya has compiled an excellent critical edition accompanied by a commentary by Ibn Sawdakin, which transcribes the explanations which he received from Ibn 'Arabi's own mouth, and by an anonymous commentary, the Kashf al-Ghayât, sometimes attributed to 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili but which is probably not his work.[32] Chapters LXX, LXXI and LXXII describe successively the theophanies of 'red light', 'white light' and 'green light' and the meetings that the Shaykh al-Akbar had at each of these stages: with 'Ali b. Abi Talib in the first, then with Abu Bakr and finally with 'Umar. Here we are at the closest to the mystery of the Essence which is symbolised by the 'radiant light (al-nûr al-sha'sha'ânî) by which one apprehends but which cannot itself be apprehended' because of its blinding brilliance.[33] The red light, the Kashf al-Ghayât tells us, is only a reflection of this light of the Essence in the immensity of the khayâl mutlaq, and it is still only a question here of a ru'ya mithâliyya, of a vision in imaginal form. The white light represents a more elevated degree than the red and green for, Ibn 'Arabi tells Ibn Sawdakin, 'the colour white is the only one which includes all the others.. Its rank is that of the Name of Majesty [Allâh] amongst the other Names and that of the Essence amongst the attributes.'[34] But Abu Bakr, however, who is standing in this white light, has his face turned towards the west - the place of occultation of light for the west is 'the mine of secrets': thus it is clearly pointed out to us that it is beyond the highest formal theophanies, beyond created lights, that the uncreated light of the Divine Essence is revealed to him who turns towards the 'occidental' darkness.[35]
All vision assumes a commensurateness (munâsaba) between that which sees and that which is seen. Between the divine infinity and the limitedness of the creature, this munâsaba is evidently lacking and all possibility of 'seeing God' other than in an indirect way, in the forms in which He manifests His names, seems then to be excluded.[36] If mushâhada is like that, the contemplation accessible to mortals is not even an 'advance payment' of the beatific vision promised to the elect who will see God 'like the moon on the night of the full moon': it is only a very imperfect prefiguration of it. That is what the definition that Ibn 'Arabi gives of it seems to confirm: contemplation, he says, is indeed vision (ru'ya), but a vision which is preceded, on the part of he who sees, by a knowledge of what he is going to see. It is then strictly limited since the contemplator refuses to recognise the theophany as such if it presents itself other than in conformity to his previous conception, with his î'tiqâd. Vision stricto sensu, on the contrary, presupposes the absence of this preliminary conditioning of which the contemplator is the prisoner. It receives all theophanies without subjecting them to the test of recognition, without referring them to a previous model.[37] One may note, however, that Ibn 'Arabi, despite these very rigorous technical definitions, does not feel obliged to respect the distinction thus established between mushâhada and ru'ya and, on many occasions, employs one or the other word indifferently. Nevertheless, the context allows one, as we shall see, to clear away the apparent ambiguities and contradictions.
When Ibn 'Arabi writes that 'theophany only occurs in the forms of beliefs (i'tiqâdât) or needs (hâjât)',38 or again that 'the Theophany of the Essence can only take place in the form of mental images and conceptual categories (ma'qûlât),[39] these remarks only apply to contemplation taken in its limited sense. But he also says, 'God has servants whom he has allowed to see Him in this life without waiting for the future life';[40] now, to describe what, this time, is indeed vision, he often uses the terms shuhûd and mushâhada. This is the case in a passage of the Futûhât where, speaking of the muqarrabûn (those who are brought close), a term which for him designates the highest degree of sainthood, he states that they are in perpetual contemplation and never come out of it although 'the tastes of it are varied'.[41]
How can such people overcome the obstacle which the total absence of proportion between God and man presents? 'The looks do not reach Him' states the Qur'an. Although he often has recourse to the traditional distinction between 'interior sight' (basîra) and 'exterior sight' (basar), Ibn 'Arabi overlooks it here; what he retains is the fact that the Qur'an uses the plural absâr and not the singular basar.[42] The multiplicity inherent to the creature cannot in fact grasp the One. It follows that 'it is God's look which reaches God and sees Him and not yours'.[43] 'He is the One who sees, He who is seen and that by which He is seen.'[44]
Therein resides the paradox of vision. Only he who has lost everything, he whose contemplation is free from all form, attains to the Being in His absoluteness. Nothing remains of 'he who has lost everything' (al-muflis): in contradistinction to formal theophanies, which are compatible with the subsistence (baqâ') of the creature, this tajallî which is beyond forms implies the annihilation (fanâ') of the one to whom it is granted.[45] It prevents by that very fact all appropriation of vision - and that is the true sense of the lan tarânî the grammatical 'second person' has no place besides the divine 'I'. 'The Essential Divine Reality is too elevated to be contemplated... whilst there remains a trace of the creaturial condition in the eye of the contemplator.'[46] This extinction of the contemplator in the most perfect contemplation has a logical consequence which may, however, seem strange: in this mushâhada - or to give it its real name, this ru'ya - there is neither joy, nor knowledge.[47] A logical consequence in fact since 'joy' and 'knowledge' would imply a reflexive action, a turning back on oneself which is incompatible with the sine qua non of vision of God. But would it not then be a question of a sort of coma of which one would ill understand that it constituted a privilege?
Ibn 'Arabi gives a reply to this in several of his works:[48] joy and knowledge are the fruits of mushâhada but these fruits cannot be garnered except on coming out of the contemplative state. For, corresponding to every true mushâhada (otherwise it would only be 'a drowsiness of the heart', nawmat al-qalb) there is necessarily a 'witness' (shâhid). This witness, who takes over the evidence of the vision and authenticates it (allusion to Q. 11:17, wa yatlûhu shâhidun minhu), is 'the trace left in the heart of the contemplator by the contemplation'.[49] Having regained consciousness, like Moses after the tajallî which struck him down, the individual then delights in this supreme knowledge whose price is precisely the unconditional submission to the mortal splendour of theophany. 'No one will see his Lord before he dies', the Prophet said.[50] But he also said: 'Die before you die.'[51] And that is why Ibn 'Arabi, echoing this hadîth, unhesitatingly wrote in the Kitâb al-Tajalliyât [52]: 'Demand vision and do not be afraid of being struck down!'
Are there any favoured places or times for this vision? God is free to manifest Himself when He wishes, to whom He wishes, how He wishes. But He has let His servants know the Surest of ways that lead to Him. It is only given to the creature to see God through God's eye. Now a well-known hadîth qudsi teaches us, with reference to the servant whom God loves: 'When I love him, I am his hearing by which he hears, his look by which he sees...
We are told that this servant approaches God by supererogatory acts. But, the hadîth specifies: 'He does not approach Me through something which I love more than with the acts that I have prescribed for him.' These prescribed acts, the farâ'id, are therefore above all those which may lead to vision, and the reason for this is that they already represent a form of death since the will of the servant plays no part in them: it is God alone who determines their moments and their forms.[54] But, among these obligatory acts, there is one which holds a particular importance: the ritual prayer (al-salât) which is, as the Prophet said, mi'râj al-mu'min, the 'spiritual ascension of the believer'. For Ibn 'Arabi, this ritual prayer is the favoured place for the highest theophanies. These theophanies, always new, appear hierarchically in a harmonic relation to the different positions prescribed for the believer. I have shown elsewhere[55] that some replies formulated in enigmatic terms to Tirmidhi's well-known questionnaire would be elucidated once one understood that they refer to the salât. The mysterious sessions (majâlis) during which God speaks correspond to the julûs, the sitting position, which symbolises stability, vigilance and permanence (baqâ'): conditions which are all necessary to hear the divine discourse but which exclude vision. But those to whom God thus speaks (the muhaddathûn) and who, in this respect, are 'behind a veil' are also in another respect ahl al-shuhûd, people of contemplation.
They are so when the conditions required to hear God disappear and are replaced by their opposite: annihilation, which tears the veil and of which the symbol is sujûd, prostration. Do not let the word 'symbol' mislead us. For most people prostration is most certainly nothing more than a gestural representation of this annihilation which must leave all the space to the One without second. For some, this symbol is operative and for them what Ibn 'Arabi writes in the Tanazzulât Mawsiliyya [56] is verified: 'your rising up is in your abasement'. When their body crashes against the earth, they arrive at the summit of the 'Sinaï of their being'. And, there, the lan tarânî resounds in the void; there is no longer anyone to hear it.
NOTES
1. For the biblical facts relating to the vision of God, see also Judges: 6, 22-3 and 13, 22. Cf. also the article by Colette Sirat, 'Un midrasch juif en habit musulman: la vision de Moïse sur le Mont Sinai', Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, Vol. CLXVIII, no.1, 1965, pp. 15ff.
2. Tabari, Jâmi al-Bayân, ed. Shakir, XIII, pp. 90-l05.
3. Qurtubi, Al-Jami li-Ahkâm al-Qur'ân, Cairo, 1938, VII, pp. 278-80 (on 7:143) and VII, p.54 (on 6:103).
4. Fakhr al-din Razi, Tafsîr Teheran, undated, XIV, pp. 227-34.
5. We are summing up very briefly here a set of attitudes that, of course, present divergencies which it is not appropriate to list here. On the doctrine of the Ash'arite kalâm concerning this subject see Daniel Gimaret, La Doctrine d'Al-Ash'arî, Paris, 1990, second part, Ch. X, p.329-45.
6. Bukhari, tawhîd, 24, pp.1-S.
7. Darimi, 'aqâ'id, 303, pp.11-12.
8. On Tustari, refer to the work by Gerhard Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam, Berlin-New York, 1980, pp. 165-75. Niffari's position regarding the possibility of vision here below seems to be more positive. See his Mawâqif, ed. A.J. Arberry, London, 1935 (see index for ru'yat Allâh).
9. Hujwiri, Kashf al-Mahjûb, trans. R.A. Nicholson, 6th edn, London, 1976, pp. 329-33.
10. Qushayri, Risâla, Cairo, 1957, p.40.
11. Qushayri, Lata'îf al-Isharât, ed. Ibrahim al-Basyuni, Cairo, undated, II, pp. 259-62.
12. Najm al-din Kubra, Fawâ'ih al-Jamâl, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden, 1957, paras. 42, 95, 97.
13. Ruzbehan Baqli, Arâ'is al-Bayân, Indian lithographed edn, 1315 H., I, pp. 271-7.
14. Ruzbehan Baqli, Mashrab al-Arwah, Istanbul, 1973, p.215.
15. Ibn Maja, fitan, p.33.
16. Al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya, Bulaq, 1329 H., III, p.349.
17. This hadîth does not appear in the canonic collections. For its use by Ibn 'Arabi, see for example, Futûhât, II, pp. 232, 327, 399; III, p.267.
18. There are many references to texts of Ibn 'Arabi's relating to the idea of tajallî in the work of Souad Hakim, Al-Mu'jam al-Sûfî, Beirut, 1981, pp. 257-67.
19. Futûhât, IV, p.591.
20. Ibid., I. p.166.
21. Ibid., I. p.498.
22. An oft-repeated statement. See, for example, Ibid., IV, p.19.
23. Ibid., III, pp.132-3.
24. Ibid., II. p.597. Ibn 'Arabi points out that the secret of kayfiyya is unknown even to the prophets and the angels.
25. Cf. Henry Corbin, L'imagination Créatrice dans le Soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabi, Paris, 1958, Part Two; Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, Tokyo, 1983, Ch. 11.
26. Futûhât, I, p.91.
27. On this hadîth of disputed authenticity, cf. H. Ritter, Das Meer der Seele, Leiden, 1956, pp. 445 ff. Cf. also Jili, Insân Kâmil, Cairo, 1963, Ch. 42.
28. This vision, which occurred on the night of Wednesday 4th of the month of rabî al-thânî in the year 627, is described in Futûhât, II, p. 449 (27th fasl of Ch. 198) but the diagram which accompanies the account has not been reproduced by the editor. It appears in the 1293 H edition, II, p.591, and is reproduced by Asin Palacios, El Islam Cristianizado, Madrid, 1931, p.105, by Corbin, L'imagination, p.175, and by A.A. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Ibnu'l-'Arabî, Cambridge, 1939, p.114.
29. This is specifically the title of Chapter 8 of the Futûhât which is a description of this 'imaginal world'.
30. Ibid., I, p.609; III. p.213.
31. Ibid., I, p. 397. Corbin's position, which excludes all informal contemplation, is defined in particular, in L'imagination, Part Two, Ch. 4 ('La Forme de Dieu'). It is based on a very selective reading of Ibn 'Arabi and of Jili (see, on the latter, Ch. 41 and Ch. 62 of Insân Kâmil where he refers to verse 7:143).
32. Kitâb al-Tajalliyât, Teheran, 1988. The vocabulary of the Kashf al-Ghayât presents significant differences from that of Jili. The text makes no reference, besides, to other works by Jili, contrary to the latter's custom.
33. Ibid., pp.420-i. The Prophet said of this light: Nûrun annâ arâhu, 'It is a light, how should I see it?' (Muslim, îmân, p.291; Tirmidhi, tafsîr S. 53:7). On this hadîth see Futûhât, IV, pp. 38-9.
34. Ibid., p.425. Cf. also the Kashf al-Ghayât, p.429. Note that, in the vision mentioned in Note 28, the Divine Ipseity appears to Ibn 'Arabi as a figure of white light on a background of red light.
35. On the symbolism of the west in Ibn 'Arabi, see Futûhât, I, pp. 67, 68,71; II, p.121; III, p.287; Kitâb al-Intisâr, printed in Rasâ'il Ibn al-'Arabi, Hyderabad, India, 1948, 2 vols, p.4.
36. Futûhât, IV, p.38.
37 Ibid., II, p.567.
38. Ibid., II, pp.277-8 and III, p.119. The episode of the Burning Bush illustrates, for Ibn 'Arabi, the theophany 'in the form of one's needs': because Moses is seeking fire, it is in the form of fire that God manifests Himself to him (cf. Fusûs al-Hikam, ed. A.A. Affifi, Beirut, 1946, pp. 212-13).
39. Futûhât, II, p.606.
40. Ibid., IV, p.38.
41. Ibid., III, p. 104. This Chapter 328 forms part of the series of 114 manâzil ('spiritual abodes') which, as I have shown in a recent book (Un Océan sans Rivage, Paris, 1992, Ch. III; an English translation of this work has been published by SUNY Press in 1993), correspond to the sûras of the Qur'an in reverse order. Chapter 328 corresponds to sum 56 and the terms which are used there (sâbiqûn, muqarrabûn, etc.) are taken from this sûra.
42. Futûhât, IV, pp.37-8.
43. Ibid., IV, p.2.
44. Ibid., IV, p.38.
45. Ibid., III, p.105 and JV, p.191. Such is also the position of Qashani in a short unedited letter (Risâla ft Qawlihi ta'âlâ: Arinî Unzur Ilayka) MS Yahya Ef. 2415, folios 14-15.
46. Kitâb al-Fanâ' fî'l-Mushâhada (Rasâ'il), p.2. Note that this treatise is a complement to Chapter 286 of the Futûhât which corresponds, in the order of the manâzil, to sum 98 and whose theme is taken from the first two words (lan yakun) of this sum (Un Océan sans Rivage, Ch. V).
47. Kitâb al-Tarâjim (Rasâ'il), p.42. See also Futûhât, IV, p.55.
48. See Futûhât, Ch. 266; Kitâb al-Tarâjim, p.16; Kitâb Wasâ'il al-Sâ'îl, ed. M. Profitlich, Fribourg, 1973, pp. 43-S; see also Badr al-Habashi's Kitâb al-Inbâh, ed. Denis Gril, in Annales Islamologiques, XV, 1979, p.106, para. 8.
49. Istilâhât al-Sûfiyya (Rasâ'il), no.60. This definition is taken up by Qashani, amongst others, in a work of the same title (Cairo, 1981, pp.153-4) and by Jurjani in his Ta'rifât, Cairo, 1357 H, p.114.
50. Cf. note 15.
51. Tirmidhi, qiyâma, 25. On this theme of 'initiatory death', see Futûhât, II, p.187; III, pp. 223, 288.
52. Chapter 100, p.517.
53. Bukhari, tawâdu. Ibn 'Arabi has included this hadîth in his Mishkât al-Anwâr and quotes it and comments on it many times. (Futûhât, I, p.406; III, p. 68; IV, pp. 20, 24,30, 65, 312, 321, etc.)
54. That is why, for Ibn 'Arabi (cf. in particular Futûhât, IV, pp. 24. 449), the closeness acquired by the accomplishment of obligator) acts (qurb al-farâ'id) is more perfect than that obtained by the accomplishment of supererogatory acts (qurb al-nawâfil). It is to the former that the case of the muqarrabûn corresponds (ibid., II, p.104) for whom 'contemplation is perpetual' and who see 'the multiplicity in the One and separation in union'. On this subject, see Un Océan sans Rivage, pp. 144ff. and my translation of the Ecrits Spirituels by Emir 'Abd al-Kader, Paris, 1982, note 84, pp. 202-4.
55. Un Océan sans Rivage, pp. 136ff.
56. Tanazzulât Mawsiliyya, Cairo, 1961 (under the title Latâ'if al-Asrâr), p.103.
Translated from French by Cecilia Twinch
This article appeared first in volume XIV of the Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society (1993), published as a special issue under the title "Prayer and Contemplation".
What is the potential of an ardent lover of Mowla?
Noor Mowlana Murtaza Ali (a.s.) has explained one of the great wisdoms of the personal world as follows:
"Do you think that you are a small body; while the great cosmos is contained within you? You are the speaking Book; By whose letters the hidden (secret) is revealed."
The explanation of the above wisdom is as follows:
"Although apparently this external universe is the macrocosm and man is the microcosm, yet in reality, it is the man who is the macrocosm, because the heavens and the earth of the external world are enfolded (i.e., wrapped up) in him, as mentioned in the following verses of Holy Qu'ran (21:104; 39:67). This supreme miracle takes place when the mu'min on the spiritual path becomes annihilated in the true Imam. In this the mu'mins (male and female) attain the light (57:12, 29; 66:8) and they become the speaking Book which contains the secrets of recognition within it." (Source: Manifestations of Wisdom, p. 40-41)
Noor Mowlana Murtaza Ali (a.s.) has explained one of the great wisdoms of the personal world as follows:
"Do you think that you are a small body; while the great cosmos is contained within you? You are the speaking Book; By whose letters the hidden (secret) is revealed."
The explanation of the above wisdom is as follows:
"Although apparently this external universe is the macrocosm and man is the microcosm, yet in reality, it is the man who is the macrocosm, because the heavens and the earth of the external world are enfolded (i.e., wrapped up) in him, as mentioned in the following verses of Holy Qu'ran (21:104; 39:67). This supreme miracle takes place when the mu'min on the spiritual path becomes annihilated in the true Imam. In this the mu'mins (male and female) attain the light (57:12, 29; 66:8) and they become the speaking Book which contains the secrets of recognition within it." (Source: Manifestations of Wisdom, p. 40-41)
The question:your question is in plural sense n seeking answer in absolute term.
If I understand the question correctly.You have used the word 'be'as in become'
Humans cannot become God.
While a soul of a Human can feel & achieve Oneness with God(spiritually and not physically) for a period he is blessed.
He then knows his soul and in reality it is still a mirco billionth achiever of his grace.
It is the Imam who is GOD,when one does see his Baatin Didar he knows it.It is a grace and Rehmat.
A Sufi lives in Toughts of God,which every Ismaili are blessed
'YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY HEART & THOUGHTS'
DUM HUME DUM ALI ALI
There is a Hadith
To see the face of ALI is worship.
even if one person attain marifat (gnosis)
His face is not the slightest worthy as ALI,as being blessed as worshiped
to see that persons face,even if it be of a PIR OR PAIGHAMBER.
Is this Hadith also valid for persons who attained oneness with God in one phase of journey of the their soul on earth.
The answer is big NO NO NO.......
If I understand the question correctly.You have used the word 'be'as in become'
Humans cannot become God.
While a soul of a Human can feel & achieve Oneness with God(spiritually and not physically) for a period he is blessed.
He then knows his soul and in reality it is still a mirco billionth achiever of his grace.
It is the Imam who is GOD,when one does see his Baatin Didar he knows it.It is a grace and Rehmat.
A Sufi lives in Toughts of God,which every Ismaili are blessed
'YOU ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY HEART & THOUGHTS'
DUM HUME DUM ALI ALI
There is a Hadith
To see the face of ALI is worship.
even if one person attain marifat (gnosis)
His face is not the slightest worthy as ALI,as being blessed as worshiped
to see that persons face,even if it be of a PIR OR PAIGHAMBER.
Is this Hadith also valid for persons who attained oneness with God in one phase of journey of the their soul on earth.
The answer is big NO NO NO.......
That is right nobody can become God because God is the only one there is no another god, it is a shirk if anybody beleive in another god.
However and according many literatures, ginans, Hadiths and farmans of current Imam and MSM; the human soul is eternal, it is holy soul, this soul doesn't commit any sins and this human soul is seperated from Allah's Noor, so if any person does good deeds in his entire life he/she can become fanafillah or Bakabillah during his/her lives, this means he/she can join in Allah's Noor in their lives.
But some religion like Christian, (Jesus was god) Sikh, (Nank) Buddhist (Gutam Buddha), jains (Mahawir Swami) and in Hinduisam( Rama, Krishna) were God, they believe that human being can become god, and therefore they have many gods!!! Once upon a time their these gods were a human being and after their death they are worshiped which is totally against as per Islamic principal and belief.
However and according many literatures, ginans, Hadiths and farmans of current Imam and MSM; the human soul is eternal, it is holy soul, this soul doesn't commit any sins and this human soul is seperated from Allah's Noor, so if any person does good deeds in his entire life he/she can become fanafillah or Bakabillah during his/her lives, this means he/she can join in Allah's Noor in their lives.
But some religion like Christian, (Jesus was god) Sikh, (Nank) Buddhist (Gutam Buddha), jains (Mahawir Swami) and in Hinduisam( Rama, Krishna) were God, they believe that human being can become god, and therefore they have many gods!!! Once upon a time their these gods were a human being and after their death they are worshiped which is totally against as per Islamic principal and belief.
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shiraz.virani
- Posts: 1256
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Wah bhai wah...kya baat hai agakhani bhai....beautifully explained...Looks like you been eating too many almonds these daysThat is right nobody can become God because God is the only one there is no another god, it is a shirk if anybody beleive in another god.
However and according many literatures, ginans, Hadiths and farmans of current Imam and MSM; the human soul is eternal, it is holy soul, this soul doesn't commit any sins and this human soul is seperated from Allah's Noor, so if any person does good deeds in his entire life he/she can become fanafillah or Bakabillah during his/her lives, this means he/she can join in Allah's Noor in their lives.
But some religion like Christian, (Jesus was god) Sikh, (Nank) Buddhist (Gutam Buddha), jains (Mahawir Swami) and in Hinduisam( Rama, Krishna) were God, they believe that human being can become god, and therefore they have many gods!!! Once upon a time their these gods were a human being and after their death they are worshiped which is totally against as per Islamic principal and belief.
As I said earlier bhai God does not need any religion, but all the religions need god to exist
Agakhani bhai for national president of USA
Here is a recent Gujrati article on the matter of the ginan "Sakhi Maha Pad keri vat "agakhani wrote:Don't forget there are many ginans which are full of the information which shows how to elevate our souls.
Following are some of them:
1, 'BRAHMA PRAKASH", by Pir Shams.
2, Sakhi Maha Pad keri vat by pir Sadardin.
3, 'YOGESHWAR' ginans series of Syed Imam shah are very informative for the interested person who wants to lift their soul in bandagi.
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
"God is completely different to whatever you imagine; He neither resembles anything nor can imagination [ever] attain Him, for how could imagination ever attain Him while He is totally different to what is bound by intellect and [also] different from what can be pictured in the imagination? He can be imagined only as an entity beyond reason and beyond [any] limitation." – Imam Muhammad al-Baqir,agakhani wrote:That is right nobody can become God because God is the only one there is no another god, it is a shirk if anybody beleive in another god.
However and according many literatures, ginans, Hadiths and farmans of current Imam and MSM; the human soul is eternal, it is holy soul, this soul doesn't commit any sins and this human soul is seperated from Allah's Noor, so if any person does good deeds in his entire life he/she can become fanafillah or Bakabillah during his/her lives, this means he/she can join in Allah's Noor in their lives.
But some religion like Christian, (Jesus was god) Sikh, (Nank) Buddhist (Gutam Buddha), jains (Mahawir Swami) and in Hinduisam( Rama, Krishna) were God, they believe that human being can become god, and therefore they have many gods!!! Once upon a time their these gods were a human being and after their death they are worshiped which is totally against as per Islamic principal and belief.
(Arzina Lalani, Early Shi’i Thought: The Teachings of Muhammad al-Baqir, 94)
Nevertheless the Indescribable and Unknowable can manifest in a perfect humanbeing.swamidada wrote: "God is completely different to whatever you imagine; He neither resembles anything nor can imagination [ever] attain Him, for how could imagination ever attain Him while He is totally different to what is bound by intellect and [also] different from what can be pictured in the imagination? He can be imagined only as an entity beyond reason and beyond [any] limitation." – Imam Muhammad al-Baqir,
(Arzina Lalani, Early Shi’i Thought: The Teachings of Muhammad al-Baqir, 94)
eji aalmot gaddh paattann, delam deshajee
teeyaa avtareeyaa shaah maankhaa veshjee.......het no.........2
O momins, in Iran in the capital of the Fort of Alamut, the Lord is born in the
human form(the Lord has manifested Himself in the human form).
Have a gathering...
http://ismaili.net/heritage/node/22841
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
I quoted saying of Imam al Baqir. With reference to ginan you quoted, which Imam is mentioned born in gaddh Almout? Let me quote a quatrain from ginan as answer for the ginanic part you mentioned.kmaherali wrote:Nevertheless the Indescribable and Unknowable can manifest in a perfect humanbeing.swamidada wrote: "God is completely different to whatever you imagine; He neither resembles anything nor can imagination [ever] attain Him, for how could imagination ever attain Him while He is totally different to what is bound by intellect and [also] different from what can be pictured in the imagination? He can be imagined only as an entity beyond reason and beyond [any] limitation." – Imam Muhammad al-Baqir,
(Arzina Lalani, Early Shi’i Thought: The Teachings of Muhammad al-Baqir, 94)
eji aalmot gaddh paattann, delam deshajee
teeyaa avtareeyaa shaah maankhaa veshjee.......het no.........2
O momins, in Iran in the capital of the Fort of Alamut, the Lord is born in the
human form(the Lord has manifested Himself in the human form).
Have a gathering...
http://ismaili.net/heritage/node/22841
re tu(n)hee maaraa saachaa saaee(n)yaa(n) piyujee tu(n)hee
niraalaa nira(n)jan kahee-e(n),
niraalee kahee-e(n) kuchh baata re;
gu(n)ge sapanaa paae-aa,
samaja samaja pachhataa ya re..................................I
O You, my True Lord, You are indeed my Beloved
Mysterious is the indescriptible, and mysterious are all it's descriptions and allusions. It is like a dumb person experiencing a beautiful dream and is regretful not being able to describe it to others.
The Ginan is attributed to Pir Sadardeen and the Imam during his time was Sri Islam Shah.swamidada wrote: I quoted saying of Imam al Baqir. With reference to ginan you quoted, which Imam is mentioned born in gaddh Almout? Let me quote a quatrain from ginan as answer for the ginanic part you mentioned.
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
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Historically it is wrong!!kmaherali wrote:The Ginan is attributed to Pir Sadardeen and the Imam during his time was Sri Islam Shah.swamidada wrote: I quoted saying of Imam al Baqir. With reference to ginan you quoted, which Imam is mentioned born in gaddh Almout? Let me quote a quatrain from ginan as answer for the ginanic part you mentioned.
Imam Islam Shah appointed Pir Sadardin to propagate Ismailism in subcontinent. Imam Islam Shah was born in Azarbhaijan and not in Daylam, and at that time Fort Alamut was not under control of Ismailis.
In the other thread you poated:
AARIF WA MA'RUUF BI MON YAKEEST
AA(N) KI KHUDA RA BI SHANASAD KHUDEEST
The knower and the known are the same
Who ever knows God (perfectly) is God himself
This quote should have been posted here, hence you should not argue about whether Imam is God or not.
Yes a perfect man can become God according to what you have posted.
AARIF WA MA'RUUF BI MON YAKEEST
AA(N) KI KHUDA RA BI SHANASAD KHUDEEST
The knower and the known are the same
Who ever knows God (perfectly) is God himself
This quote should have been posted here, hence you should not argue about whether Imam is God or not.
Yes a perfect man can become God according to what you have posted.
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
You did not answer my query. Was Imam Islam Shah born in Azarbhaijan or Gaddh Almout?swamidada wrote:Historically it is wrong!!kmaherali wrote:The Ginan is attributed to Pir Sadardeen and the Imam during his time was Sri Islam Shah.swamidada wrote: I quoted saying of Imam al Baqir. With reference to ginan you quoted, which Imam is mentioned born in gaddh Almout? Let me quote a quatrain from ginan as answer for the ginanic part you mentioned.
Imam Islam Shah appointed Pir Sadardin to propagate Ismailism in subcontinent. Imam Islam Shah was born in Azarbhaijan and not in Daylam, and at that time Fort Alamut was not under control of Ismailis.
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
The couplet I mentioned is said in honor of Al Hallaj, Bayzid Bustami, Bibi Rabia and other Aarifs, Imam's spiritual status is most high. The names I mentioned and other such persons were true follower of Mowla Ali. Your post smells as Imam recognized Ma'ruuf and become one with Him.kmaherali wrote:In the other thread you poated:
AARIF WA MA'RUUF BI MON YAKEEST
AA(N) KI KHUDA RA BI SHANASAD KHUDEEST
The knower and the known are the same
Who ever knows God (perfectly) is God himself
This quote should have been posted here, hence you should not argue about whether Imam is God or not.
Yes a perfect man can become God according to what you have posted.
swamidada wrote:The couplet I mentioned is said in honor of Al Hallaj, Bayzid Bustami, Bibi Rabia and other Aarifs, Imam's spiritual status is most high. The names I mentioned and other such persons were true follower of Mowla Ali. Your post smells as Imam recognized Ma'ruuf and become one with Him.kmaherali wrote:In the other thread you poated:
AARIF WA MA'RUUF BI MON YAKEEST
AA(N) KI KHUDA RA BI SHANASAD KHUDEEST
The knower and the known are the same
Who ever knows God (perfectly) is God himself
This quote should have been posted here, hence you should not argue about whether Imam is God or not.
Yes a perfect man can become God according to what you have posted.
Hence there is no need to question the status of the Imam as God. Imams are born with this status, others attain the status thrugh Ibadat.swamidada wrote: The couplet I mentioned is said in honor of Al Hallaj, Bayzid Bustami, Bibi Rabia and other Aarifs, Imam's spiritual status is most high. The names I mentioned and other such persons were true follower of Mowla Ali. Your post smells as Imam recognized Ma'ruuf and become one with Him
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
Still waiting for answer from your side. Is it a hard question? You are trapped.swamidada wrote:You did not answer my query. Was Imam Islam Shah born in Azarbhaijan or Gaddh Almout?swamidada wrote:Historically it is wrong!!kmaherali wrote:The Ginan is attributed to Pir Sadardeen and the Imam during his time was Sri Islam Shah.
Imam Islam Shah appointed Pir Sadardin to propagate Ismailism in subcontinent. Imam Islam Shah was born in Azarbhaijan and not in Daylam, and at that time Fort Alamut was not under control of Ismailis.
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
Though I do not want to further involve in status discussion, but you wrote, "Imams are born with this status".kmaherali wrote:Hence there is no need to question the status of the Imam as God. Imams are born with this status, others attain the status thrugh Ibadat.swamidada wrote: The couplet I mentioned is said in honor of Al Hallaj, Bayzid Bustami, Bibi Rabia and other Aarifs, Imam's spiritual status is most high. The names I mentioned and other such persons were true follower of Mowla Ali. Your post smells as Imam recognized Ma'ruuf and become one with Him
Status given by Whom??
" Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The Parable of His Light is as if there were a Niche and within it a Lamp: the Lamp enclosed in Glass: the glass as it were a brilliant star: Lit from a blessed Tree, an Olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it: Light upon Light! Allah doth guide whom He will to His Light: Allah doth set forth Parables for men: and Allah doth know all things".(Sura of light)swamidada wrote: Though I do not want to further involve in status discussion, but you wrote, "Imams are born with this status".
Status given by Whom??
"the oil is well - nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it" - The Imamat is a self perpetuating institution independent of any external agency, is not guided or influenced by anyone or elected by the people.
"Light upon light" - Imamat is perpetual and never ends. Imam after Imam, the guidance continues forever.[/b]
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swamidada_2
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- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
Your answer is not to the point. There is no mention of status or Imamat in ayat e Noor. You wrote," "Imams are born with this status".kmaherali wrote:" Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The Parable of His Light is as if there were a Niche and within it a Lamp: the Lamp enclosed in Glass: the glass as it were a brilliant star: Lit from a blessed Tree, an Olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it: Light upon Light! Allah doth guide whom He will to His Light: Allah doth set forth Parables for men: and Allah doth know all things".(Sura of light)swamidada wrote: Though I do not want to further involve in status discussion, but you wrote, "Imams are born with this status".
Status given by Whom??
"the oil is well - nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it" - The Imamat is a self perpetuating institution independent of any external agency, is not guided or influenced by anyone or elected by the people.
"Light upon light" - Imamat is perpetual and never ends. Imam after Imam, the guidance continues forever.[/b]
There are thousands of interpretations of the Quran says our Imam. So everyone is entitled to his own interpretation. There is a consensus in the community that Noorun Allah Noor refers to the Imam.swamidada wrote: Your answer is not to the point. There is no mention of status or Imamat in ayat e Noor. You wrote," "Imams are born with this status".
It does not mean some will not disagree, of course it will happen. There are always some who differ in views with the interpretations of the community as guided by the Imam. This also is OK. Once talking of pluralism, Imam said we have to accept all the religions, this included also people who do not believe, the atheist. So the largest of the mercy of the Imam encompass everyone.
I also differ in that Imams are born Imams since birth, I believe they become Imam when the Light of the previous Imam manifest itself in them.
But it does not mean that I will start world war III over each disagreement.
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swamidada_2
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No doubt there are over hundred thousands of Tafsirs and interpretations of Quran available, I do not argue with that, but I have noticed when kmaherali is trapped, is clueless, is drifted away from topic, or give wrong explanation you jumped in to rescue him as fire fighter. It has happened many times.
Yes, a friend in need is friend indeed, how's that!!
Yes, a friend in need is friend indeed, how's that!!
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swamidada_2
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Mon Aug 19, 2019 8:18 pm
Exploring Isma‘ili Muslim Perspectives…
ISMA‘ILI WELLSPRINGS
APRIL 4, 2017 BY ISMAILI WELLSPRINGS
“Vision comprehendeth Him not…”: Ismaili Doctrine of God Beyond Being and Non-being
In this article, Sujjawal Ahmad introduces the view of God presented in the Classical Ismaili Philosophy.
“God is completely different to whatever you imagine; He neither resembles anything nor can imagination [ever] attain Him,for how could imagination ever attain Him while He is totally different to what is bound by reason and [also] different from what can be pictured in imagination?He can be imagined only as an entity beyond reason and beyond [ any] limitation. ”
-Imam al-Baqir (Early Shi’i Thought, Arzina R. Lalani, p.94)
The scriptures of all Abrahamic religions are emphatic with regard to the unity of God. There is but one God:
“There is no god but He the Exalted in Power the Wise.” Qur’án 3:18
“I [am] the Lord, and [there is] none else, [there is] no God beside me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me: That they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that [there is] none beside me. I [am] the Lord , and [there is] none else.” Isaiah 45:5–6
In Islam ‘Tawḥīd‘ is a simple declaration of the absolute oneness of God. Held unanimously by all schools of thought, it forms a very foundation of the Islamic doctrine. Ismaili philosophy, with an aim to preclude any taint of duality, describes God such that there is no compromise to God’s unique integrity in any way. God is seen such that He is absolutely beyond any description or definition. There is no way to demonstrate His Nature with rational reasoning. The topic has been a matter of much debates throughout history of religion, the study of which is full of extensive and complex analysis. In this article, I wish to take a close look at the view of God presented in the writings of Ismaili thinkers.
GOD – THE ULTIMATE REALITY:
The concept of God called classical theism, that is found in the intellectual and philosophical traditions of all monotheistic religions, conceives God as an Ultimate or Absolute Reality. The differences concerning the nature of the Ultimate Reality, however, have been a great source of disagreement and conflict throughout history of religion.
The concept of Classical Theism is based on Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy, was developed during the 3rd Century by St. Augustine (heavily influenced by Plotinus ) and St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th Century, was further extended by Neoplatonic traditions of Medieval times in Islam like those of Mulla Sadra, Ibn-e- Sina, and Ismaili Philosphers. In modern times, David Bentley Hart has widely defended classical theism.
The Quran describes God in this way:
“Vision comprehendeth Him not, but He comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the Subtile, the Aware.” (al-Quran, alAnaam; 103)
The aspect of the concept of God in Ismailism that distinguishes it most from others, as we have already seen, is that for Ismaili thinkers, God is an all transcendent Reality which cannot be described with a simile, analogy or definition. God is beyond all ranks, grades and degrees (maratib ) and totally transcends unity and plurality, perfection and imperfection, such that there is no way to tolerate human perception of Him.
Ismaili Imams have insisted on the fact that there is no way of comprehension of God. Human beings have had and can have no success in trying to obtain any comprehension of God. The demonstration thus becomes a coherent doctrine to understand ‘One Who is above all else’:
“Praise be to Allah. He is such that senses cannot perceive Him, place cannot contain Him, eyes cannot see Him” (Nahjul Balagha: Sermon 185)
“He who assigns to Him (different) conditions does not believe in His oneness, nor does he who likens Him grasp His reality. He who illustrates Him does not signify Him” (Nahjul Balagha: Sermon 186).
It is impossible for human mind to grasp the understanding of Him because human mind is able to understand, describe or elaborate only that which has been created or originated by God while He, Himself is totally beyond our comprehension, perception and description. There is neither the way of thought to grasp His understanding nor there is any room for a speaker to speak about Him. He is beyond human description by use of language, as Human speech and speaker are both dependent on what has been created by Him.
“Speech (or reason, Nutq) is powerless, unable to penetrate the true realities and understanding (haqa’iq wa basa’ir) of His ipseity (huwiyyat)”
-Sayyidina Nāsir Khusrāu (Shish fasl, trans. Ivano ,The First Chapter, on the Recognition of the Oneness of God)
ASSOCIATING GOD ATTRIBUTES OF CREATURES: ENTAILS POLYTHEISM?
In Ismaili system of thought, God holds the position of an Unknowable Reality whose Ipseity (essence) cannot be perceived through senses and is totally beyond human perception and comprehension. So, God cannot be the object of discursive thought, because our brains cannot deal with Him in the way that they deal with everything else.
“The veracity of those who profess tawḥīd is confirmed when they attest that He cannot be expressed neither by an outward speech, nor by an interior thought. How could letters refer to an entity that brings into existence all things created, emanated and produced?”
– Sayyidina Hamid uddin al-Kirmānī, ( Rāḥat al aql, 145) .
Because God is absolutely unique in His Essence, He cannot be compared to any of the things that exist in the normal, contingent sense. To associate with God the attributes of his creatures entails polytheism and interferes with the sanctity of the tawhid, as Nāsir Khusrāu would insist:
“This group who keep claiming to uphold oneness are in fact polytheists. They ascribe creaturely traits to God. This entails granting partnership to man with God in the form of knowledge, hearing, seeing, a face, limbs, and motion from place to place. This group’s belief is an admission of polytheism.”
– Sayyidina Nasir khusrau , [Kitāb-i Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn, trans. Ormsby 50]
It is thus a radical error to seek to explain God in rational terms, not simply because of the limitations of the human mind but also because any natural idea we form about God is bound to be flawed, and therefore, to worship God with such an understanding is a mere idolatry and entails polytheism.
“Nor can it be true tawḥīd to ascribe creaturely qualities to God. On the contrary, that is anthropomorphism.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau , [Kitāb-i Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn, trans Ormsby 67]
For Ismaili thinkers, it is thus, not true for us to ascribe God attributes that are characteristic of those things that exist because of His Command. It is not proper for us to ascribe Him any quality that belongs to His creatures. All attributes and qualities that human mind can think of, exist due to His Divine Will; and to associate with Him anything that human mind can think of, according to Nāsir Khusrāu, is to associate with Him a lie.
BEYOND THEISM AND MONOTHEISM: THE IDEA OF MONOREALISM
The idea of Monorealism implies that there is only a single Absolute Reality – everything else only a relative reality. This view implies that the Absolute Reality cannot be considered as a cause, while any reality other than God appears to be dependent on other realities, that is to say, they can never be termed as Absolute. This concept of the nature of the Ultimate Reality can be called mono-realism since it considers that there is only one Absolute Reality. It also differs from monotheism in that it considers the Ultimate Reality as an impersonal Reality void of any attributes. This Reality does not act in the world and cannot be said to possess those features that are typical of theism, such as intervening in the world or being pleased with certain human beings and angry with others.
During history of religion, concept of God has been expressed in different means and senses. One of the theologians in the Christian world of 13th century, Thomas Aquinas, for example, who attempted to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with the principles of Christianity, has extended the idea of God as an Unknowable Reality. For him knowledge is proportional to the existence thing. But God is above all existence. Therefore, He is above knowledge; In Chapter 1 of ‘On the Divine Names’, while referring Isaiah 40:18 ‘With whom, then, will you compare God? To what image will you liken him?’, he concludes that God cannot be known by the human intellect. He considers God as a self-evident and self existing Reality that need not any demonstration to be proved.
Seemingly, like many philosophers of the Muslim world, he identifies God as the First Mover or what would Avicenna call Wajib ul Wajood (existence of which is necessary), the Cause of all causes. According to this view, God holds position of a cause, instead of being an Independent Reality.
It is essential to note that Ismaili position on what is the First Cause is different from this demonstration. For Ismaili philosophers, this kind of notion no longer preserves the absolute transcendence of God. In Ismaili metaphysics, the Cause of all causes is His Divine Will, not God Himself. So God is a Reality that is independent of being cause of any existence, yet His Will encompasses every thing that exists.
There is another point where Aquinas’ demonstration would differ from Ismaili philosophy. Since for him God is the ‘uncaused cause’ so He, from whom everything else is created, “contains within Himself the whole perfection of being”. For Ismaili thinkers, on the other hand, the whole perfection of being is in the first oiginated Being, called Universal Intellect.
It will be interesting to note at this point that Paul Tillich, a 20th century Christian theologian, being a leading opponent of Natural Theology, aslo disagrees with the theistic tradition, he writes :
“The concept of a ‘Personal God’ interfering with natural events, or being ‘an independent cause of natural events’, makes God a natural object beside others, an object among others, a being among beings, maybe the highest, but nevertheless a being. This indeed is not only the destruction of the physical system but even more the destruction of any meaningful idea of God.”
-Paul Tillich, Theology and Culture (New York and Oxford,) 1964, P.129
ISMAILI MUSLIM APPROACH OF DOUBLE NEGATION: BEYOND TA’ATIL AND TASHBIH
The methods of attribution of God, which is one of the aspects popular among orthodox schools of theologians of world religions, have been very utterly and strongly discouraged by Ismaili thinkers and they have termed it as a total anthropomorphism (mushabida ). However, at the same time, Ismaili thinkers also reject the most radically anti-anthropomorphic doctrine of the rationalist Mu‘tazila who had sought path of going too far in their negation of attributes from God.
“Even if all beings (hast-ha) disappear, He will not suffer any loss (nuqsan) in His oneness, because it is the Ipseity (huwiyyat) of God which has brought them into being. The categories of cause and caused, property and being in possession of property, limit and being limited, cannot be either attributed to Him, or denied to Him, or have any likeness to Him. In fact, these categories never possessed such likeness, that He might become greater with the addition of them, or suffer a loss without them. He is beyond being or not-being.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau (Shish fasl, Ivano trans.The First Chapter, on the Recognition of the Oneness of God)
As it would be an act of sheer denudation of the Divine Essence, if we merely repudiate God of His existence, or of Him being Merciful – a term used for this act is Ta’til, that is to negate God of His attributes as opposed to Tashbih which means to ascribe God with creaturely attributes. Since the mere negation of God’s attributes is not enough to consider Him an absolutely transcendent Reality, Ismaili thinkers, thus, have tried to solve this paradox by taking another approach in the form of ‘double negation’.
“…transcendentiation (mujarrad kardan) of the Creator is not achieved completely except through the elimination of that which opposes these eliminations, eliminating the first in order for is to avoid tashbih and in elimination the latter to avoid ta’til.”
-Sayyidina Abu Ya’qub al-Sijistani ( Kashf-al-Mahjub, p 14–15)
“There is no more sublime and more noble form of denudation than the way we denudate our Creator by those statements which juxtapose two negations: a negation and the negation of this negation”
-Sayyidina Abu Ya’qub al-Sijistānī
According to this approach of double negation, we should begin, firstly, by talking about God in negatives, saying, for example, that He is ‘non-being’ rather than ‘being’, not in space rather in space, not limited rather than limited and so forth. But this rather lifeless and abstract negation should immediately be negated, saying that God is ‘not non-being’ or that He is not ‘No-thing’ and so on. By a repeated use of this linguistic discipline, anyone would become aware of that He is totally different from His creatures and that He shares not the slightest quality with them; and such a double negative approach to God does nothing more than making one realize the inadequacy of human language when it tries to convey the mystery of God. That is what indeed the ultimate aim of tawḥīd: professing the absolute unity of God by removing from Him all that implies multiplicity (including the number ‘one’ which refers to the Intellect).
Ismaili thinkers have presented a wide discussion on the nature or qualification of ‘being or existence’ and how can it relate to God, and they have reasoned in a way that, God is beyond the nature of existence and non- exitence, being and non-being. It requires explanation here in understanding what does word ‘being’ mean to Ismaili thinkers. Al-Sijistani, for example, argues in the first chapter of his Kashf-al-majub, ‘Being ( hasti ) only applies to that entity that can be imagined as non being ( nisti ), or by relating it to anything that precedes it or dominates it’. As in both ways, the notion of being cannot be applied to God, so it can be understood that the quality of something to be called being itself comes into existence as a result of God’s command, and can only be characteristic of creatures not God Himself.
We cannot call God that He exists, for anything that exists, it means it is either a substance and the existence of a substance depends upon anything else that serves as its cause. That simply means is if He were a substance then He would not be exempted from the aspects of need and multiplicity that are inseparable from the substance. God, in His complete transcendence, is above being preceded by something else. There is no cause for him, so He is excluded from being existent. But at the same time we also exclude the idea of God from being non-existent, in order to avoid the notion of His denial.
“It is not befitting for God to be either the cause or the effect, and it is therefore not appropriate to say that God is an existent. It should be known that the Absolute Existent [the Command of God] is originated by Him, and His Ipseity transcends existence [and] its opposite which is nonexistence.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau ,(Gushayish wa Rahayish, trans.Hunzai, 42)
Since being and existence correspond to the sincere existence, but God’s Ipseity is beyond and superior than ideas human mind can form, He must be assumed beyond the quality of being existent. Existence is the result of His Command that is revealed in the Word ‘Kun’, which serves as the creative intermediary between God and the Intellect (the first originated / created being ) and, thus, bridges the gap between the transcendent Reality of God and the created world. God’s Command is undeniable, unstoppable, unending and eternal, which means that the creative act of God is not bound to time. So, the Universal Intellect, which is its effect, is also eternal and timeless.
Conclusion:
In this article, we have examined various points of Ismaili approach of classical theism against traditional theism. We have examined how Ismaili Philosophy describes Taw’heed at different levels:
Firstly that God is ‘One’, and an Absolute Reality which transcends time and space, analogy or description.
Secondly, the assertion that human minds are incapable to grasp an understanding or comprehension of the Ultimate Reality.
Thirdly, Ismaili Philosophers place God beyond the attributes described in the scriptures, and associate those attributes to the Universal Intellect. For them while God is Beyond all attributes, these are Manifested through His Divine Command in the Form of the Most Perfect Intellect also termed as Light of God in the Qur’an. The Command of God ‘Kun‘ is the source of manifestation of Divine attributes in ‘Nur‘ and hence the source of all being and therefore the point of origin towards which human beings seek to return.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
The author is a Pakistan based writer and science student. Sujjawal holds a Masters degree in Molecular Biology from Quaid-i Azam University, Pakistan, where his work and research focused on targeted molecular therapeutics. He has a passion for philosophy, and has written several articles on classical philosophy and comparative religions.
ISMA‘ILI WELLSPRINGS
APRIL 4, 2017 BY ISMAILI WELLSPRINGS
“Vision comprehendeth Him not…”: Ismaili Doctrine of God Beyond Being and Non-being
In this article, Sujjawal Ahmad introduces the view of God presented in the Classical Ismaili Philosophy.
“God is completely different to whatever you imagine; He neither resembles anything nor can imagination [ever] attain Him,for how could imagination ever attain Him while He is totally different to what is bound by reason and [also] different from what can be pictured in imagination?He can be imagined only as an entity beyond reason and beyond [ any] limitation. ”
-Imam al-Baqir (Early Shi’i Thought, Arzina R. Lalani, p.94)
The scriptures of all Abrahamic religions are emphatic with regard to the unity of God. There is but one God:
“There is no god but He the Exalted in Power the Wise.” Qur’án 3:18
“I [am] the Lord, and [there is] none else, [there is] no God beside me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me: That they may know from the rising of the sun, and from the west, that [there is] none beside me. I [am] the Lord , and [there is] none else.” Isaiah 45:5–6
In Islam ‘Tawḥīd‘ is a simple declaration of the absolute oneness of God. Held unanimously by all schools of thought, it forms a very foundation of the Islamic doctrine. Ismaili philosophy, with an aim to preclude any taint of duality, describes God such that there is no compromise to God’s unique integrity in any way. God is seen such that He is absolutely beyond any description or definition. There is no way to demonstrate His Nature with rational reasoning. The topic has been a matter of much debates throughout history of religion, the study of which is full of extensive and complex analysis. In this article, I wish to take a close look at the view of God presented in the writings of Ismaili thinkers.
GOD – THE ULTIMATE REALITY:
The concept of God called classical theism, that is found in the intellectual and philosophical traditions of all monotheistic religions, conceives God as an Ultimate or Absolute Reality. The differences concerning the nature of the Ultimate Reality, however, have been a great source of disagreement and conflict throughout history of religion.
The concept of Classical Theism is based on Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy, was developed during the 3rd Century by St. Augustine (heavily influenced by Plotinus ) and St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th Century, was further extended by Neoplatonic traditions of Medieval times in Islam like those of Mulla Sadra, Ibn-e- Sina, and Ismaili Philosphers. In modern times, David Bentley Hart has widely defended classical theism.
The Quran describes God in this way:
“Vision comprehendeth Him not, but He comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the Subtile, the Aware.” (al-Quran, alAnaam; 103)
The aspect of the concept of God in Ismailism that distinguishes it most from others, as we have already seen, is that for Ismaili thinkers, God is an all transcendent Reality which cannot be described with a simile, analogy or definition. God is beyond all ranks, grades and degrees (maratib ) and totally transcends unity and plurality, perfection and imperfection, such that there is no way to tolerate human perception of Him.
Ismaili Imams have insisted on the fact that there is no way of comprehension of God. Human beings have had and can have no success in trying to obtain any comprehension of God. The demonstration thus becomes a coherent doctrine to understand ‘One Who is above all else’:
“Praise be to Allah. He is such that senses cannot perceive Him, place cannot contain Him, eyes cannot see Him” (Nahjul Balagha: Sermon 185)
“He who assigns to Him (different) conditions does not believe in His oneness, nor does he who likens Him grasp His reality. He who illustrates Him does not signify Him” (Nahjul Balagha: Sermon 186).
It is impossible for human mind to grasp the understanding of Him because human mind is able to understand, describe or elaborate only that which has been created or originated by God while He, Himself is totally beyond our comprehension, perception and description. There is neither the way of thought to grasp His understanding nor there is any room for a speaker to speak about Him. He is beyond human description by use of language, as Human speech and speaker are both dependent on what has been created by Him.
“Speech (or reason, Nutq) is powerless, unable to penetrate the true realities and understanding (haqa’iq wa basa’ir) of His ipseity (huwiyyat)”
-Sayyidina Nāsir Khusrāu (Shish fasl, trans. Ivano ,The First Chapter, on the Recognition of the Oneness of God)
ASSOCIATING GOD ATTRIBUTES OF CREATURES: ENTAILS POLYTHEISM?
In Ismaili system of thought, God holds the position of an Unknowable Reality whose Ipseity (essence) cannot be perceived through senses and is totally beyond human perception and comprehension. So, God cannot be the object of discursive thought, because our brains cannot deal with Him in the way that they deal with everything else.
“The veracity of those who profess tawḥīd is confirmed when they attest that He cannot be expressed neither by an outward speech, nor by an interior thought. How could letters refer to an entity that brings into existence all things created, emanated and produced?”
– Sayyidina Hamid uddin al-Kirmānī, ( Rāḥat al aql, 145) .
Because God is absolutely unique in His Essence, He cannot be compared to any of the things that exist in the normal, contingent sense. To associate with God the attributes of his creatures entails polytheism and interferes with the sanctity of the tawhid, as Nāsir Khusrāu would insist:
“This group who keep claiming to uphold oneness are in fact polytheists. They ascribe creaturely traits to God. This entails granting partnership to man with God in the form of knowledge, hearing, seeing, a face, limbs, and motion from place to place. This group’s belief is an admission of polytheism.”
– Sayyidina Nasir khusrau , [Kitāb-i Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn, trans. Ormsby 50]
It is thus a radical error to seek to explain God in rational terms, not simply because of the limitations of the human mind but also because any natural idea we form about God is bound to be flawed, and therefore, to worship God with such an understanding is a mere idolatry and entails polytheism.
“Nor can it be true tawḥīd to ascribe creaturely qualities to God. On the contrary, that is anthropomorphism.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau , [Kitāb-i Jāmiʿ al-ḥikmatayn, trans Ormsby 67]
For Ismaili thinkers, it is thus, not true for us to ascribe God attributes that are characteristic of those things that exist because of His Command. It is not proper for us to ascribe Him any quality that belongs to His creatures. All attributes and qualities that human mind can think of, exist due to His Divine Will; and to associate with Him anything that human mind can think of, according to Nāsir Khusrāu, is to associate with Him a lie.
BEYOND THEISM AND MONOTHEISM: THE IDEA OF MONOREALISM
The idea of Monorealism implies that there is only a single Absolute Reality – everything else only a relative reality. This view implies that the Absolute Reality cannot be considered as a cause, while any reality other than God appears to be dependent on other realities, that is to say, they can never be termed as Absolute. This concept of the nature of the Ultimate Reality can be called mono-realism since it considers that there is only one Absolute Reality. It also differs from monotheism in that it considers the Ultimate Reality as an impersonal Reality void of any attributes. This Reality does not act in the world and cannot be said to possess those features that are typical of theism, such as intervening in the world or being pleased with certain human beings and angry with others.
During history of religion, concept of God has been expressed in different means and senses. One of the theologians in the Christian world of 13th century, Thomas Aquinas, for example, who attempted to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with the principles of Christianity, has extended the idea of God as an Unknowable Reality. For him knowledge is proportional to the existence thing. But God is above all existence. Therefore, He is above knowledge; In Chapter 1 of ‘On the Divine Names’, while referring Isaiah 40:18 ‘With whom, then, will you compare God? To what image will you liken him?’, he concludes that God cannot be known by the human intellect. He considers God as a self-evident and self existing Reality that need not any demonstration to be proved.
Seemingly, like many philosophers of the Muslim world, he identifies God as the First Mover or what would Avicenna call Wajib ul Wajood (existence of which is necessary), the Cause of all causes. According to this view, God holds position of a cause, instead of being an Independent Reality.
It is essential to note that Ismaili position on what is the First Cause is different from this demonstration. For Ismaili philosophers, this kind of notion no longer preserves the absolute transcendence of God. In Ismaili metaphysics, the Cause of all causes is His Divine Will, not God Himself. So God is a Reality that is independent of being cause of any existence, yet His Will encompasses every thing that exists.
There is another point where Aquinas’ demonstration would differ from Ismaili philosophy. Since for him God is the ‘uncaused cause’ so He, from whom everything else is created, “contains within Himself the whole perfection of being”. For Ismaili thinkers, on the other hand, the whole perfection of being is in the first oiginated Being, called Universal Intellect.
It will be interesting to note at this point that Paul Tillich, a 20th century Christian theologian, being a leading opponent of Natural Theology, aslo disagrees with the theistic tradition, he writes :
“The concept of a ‘Personal God’ interfering with natural events, or being ‘an independent cause of natural events’, makes God a natural object beside others, an object among others, a being among beings, maybe the highest, but nevertheless a being. This indeed is not only the destruction of the physical system but even more the destruction of any meaningful idea of God.”
-Paul Tillich, Theology and Culture (New York and Oxford,) 1964, P.129
ISMAILI MUSLIM APPROACH OF DOUBLE NEGATION: BEYOND TA’ATIL AND TASHBIH
The methods of attribution of God, which is one of the aspects popular among orthodox schools of theologians of world religions, have been very utterly and strongly discouraged by Ismaili thinkers and they have termed it as a total anthropomorphism (mushabida ). However, at the same time, Ismaili thinkers also reject the most radically anti-anthropomorphic doctrine of the rationalist Mu‘tazila who had sought path of going too far in their negation of attributes from God.
“Even if all beings (hast-ha) disappear, He will not suffer any loss (nuqsan) in His oneness, because it is the Ipseity (huwiyyat) of God which has brought them into being. The categories of cause and caused, property and being in possession of property, limit and being limited, cannot be either attributed to Him, or denied to Him, or have any likeness to Him. In fact, these categories never possessed such likeness, that He might become greater with the addition of them, or suffer a loss without them. He is beyond being or not-being.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau (Shish fasl, Ivano trans.The First Chapter, on the Recognition of the Oneness of God)
As it would be an act of sheer denudation of the Divine Essence, if we merely repudiate God of His existence, or of Him being Merciful – a term used for this act is Ta’til, that is to negate God of His attributes as opposed to Tashbih which means to ascribe God with creaturely attributes. Since the mere negation of God’s attributes is not enough to consider Him an absolutely transcendent Reality, Ismaili thinkers, thus, have tried to solve this paradox by taking another approach in the form of ‘double negation’.
“…transcendentiation (mujarrad kardan) of the Creator is not achieved completely except through the elimination of that which opposes these eliminations, eliminating the first in order for is to avoid tashbih and in elimination the latter to avoid ta’til.”
-Sayyidina Abu Ya’qub al-Sijistani ( Kashf-al-Mahjub, p 14–15)
“There is no more sublime and more noble form of denudation than the way we denudate our Creator by those statements which juxtapose two negations: a negation and the negation of this negation”
-Sayyidina Abu Ya’qub al-Sijistānī
According to this approach of double negation, we should begin, firstly, by talking about God in negatives, saying, for example, that He is ‘non-being’ rather than ‘being’, not in space rather in space, not limited rather than limited and so forth. But this rather lifeless and abstract negation should immediately be negated, saying that God is ‘not non-being’ or that He is not ‘No-thing’ and so on. By a repeated use of this linguistic discipline, anyone would become aware of that He is totally different from His creatures and that He shares not the slightest quality with them; and such a double negative approach to God does nothing more than making one realize the inadequacy of human language when it tries to convey the mystery of God. That is what indeed the ultimate aim of tawḥīd: professing the absolute unity of God by removing from Him all that implies multiplicity (including the number ‘one’ which refers to the Intellect).
Ismaili thinkers have presented a wide discussion on the nature or qualification of ‘being or existence’ and how can it relate to God, and they have reasoned in a way that, God is beyond the nature of existence and non- exitence, being and non-being. It requires explanation here in understanding what does word ‘being’ mean to Ismaili thinkers. Al-Sijistani, for example, argues in the first chapter of his Kashf-al-majub, ‘Being ( hasti ) only applies to that entity that can be imagined as non being ( nisti ), or by relating it to anything that precedes it or dominates it’. As in both ways, the notion of being cannot be applied to God, so it can be understood that the quality of something to be called being itself comes into existence as a result of God’s command, and can only be characteristic of creatures not God Himself.
We cannot call God that He exists, for anything that exists, it means it is either a substance and the existence of a substance depends upon anything else that serves as its cause. That simply means is if He were a substance then He would not be exempted from the aspects of need and multiplicity that are inseparable from the substance. God, in His complete transcendence, is above being preceded by something else. There is no cause for him, so He is excluded from being existent. But at the same time we also exclude the idea of God from being non-existent, in order to avoid the notion of His denial.
“It is not befitting for God to be either the cause or the effect, and it is therefore not appropriate to say that God is an existent. It should be known that the Absolute Existent [the Command of God] is originated by Him, and His Ipseity transcends existence [and] its opposite which is nonexistence.”
-Sayyidina Nasir khusrau ,(Gushayish wa Rahayish, trans.Hunzai, 42)
Since being and existence correspond to the sincere existence, but God’s Ipseity is beyond and superior than ideas human mind can form, He must be assumed beyond the quality of being existent. Existence is the result of His Command that is revealed in the Word ‘Kun’, which serves as the creative intermediary between God and the Intellect (the first originated / created being ) and, thus, bridges the gap between the transcendent Reality of God and the created world. God’s Command is undeniable, unstoppable, unending and eternal, which means that the creative act of God is not bound to time. So, the Universal Intellect, which is its effect, is also eternal and timeless.
Conclusion:
In this article, we have examined various points of Ismaili approach of classical theism against traditional theism. We have examined how Ismaili Philosophy describes Taw’heed at different levels:
Firstly that God is ‘One’, and an Absolute Reality which transcends time and space, analogy or description.
Secondly, the assertion that human minds are incapable to grasp an understanding or comprehension of the Ultimate Reality.
Thirdly, Ismaili Philosophers place God beyond the attributes described in the scriptures, and associate those attributes to the Universal Intellect. For them while God is Beyond all attributes, these are Manifested through His Divine Command in the Form of the Most Perfect Intellect also termed as Light of God in the Qur’an. The Command of God ‘Kun‘ is the source of manifestation of Divine attributes in ‘Nur‘ and hence the source of all being and therefore the point of origin towards which human beings seek to return.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
The author is a Pakistan based writer and science student. Sujjawal holds a Masters degree in Molecular Biology from Quaid-i Azam University, Pakistan, where his work and research focused on targeted molecular therapeutics. He has a passion for philosophy, and has written several articles on classical philosophy and comparative religions.